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Speech Interests Inherent in the Location of 
Billboards and Signs: A Method for Unweaving the 
Tangled Web of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Project Billboard is an anti-war movement that has gained 
attention by posting anti-war billboards in Times Square and other 
high-profile locations.1 With billboards portraying messages such as 
“Democracy is best taught by example, not by war,” and “Stop 
intelligence failures. Fund public education.”2 Project Billboard has 
sought to spread its anti-war message to the masses. Project 
Billboard’s campaign against the Iraq War is a paradigmatic example 
of using billboards to advance a political agenda. Billboards serve a 
unique role in our society by placing both noncommercial messages, 
such as Project Billboard’s anti-war message, and commercial 
messages before a captive audience.3 In so doing, billboards 
represent a major means of advertising both commercial and 
noncommercial messages. There are more than 500,000 billboards 
along major highways in America, with an annual increase of 
anywhere from 5000 to 15,000 billboards.4 Billboards are a $1.8 
billion industry.5
Despite their utility in communicating commercial 
advertisements or political viewpoints to a mass audience, many 
critics see billboards as an eyesore to the community.6 Indeed, 
because billboards are “designed to stand out and apart from [their] 
 1. Project Billboard, http://www.projectbillboard.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. In Packer Corp. v. Utah, Justice Brandeis determined that viewers of billboards and 
streetcar signs were captive audiences in the sense that the messages were “thrust upon them 
by all the arts and devices that skill can produce.” 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932). While ads in 
magazines can be ignored and radio ads can be turned off, a billboard advertisement has a 
captive audience of drivers along a road. Id. 
 4. Scenic America, Billboards & Sign Control, http://www.scenic.org/ 
Default.aspx?tabid=166 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See generally Scenic America, http://www.scenic.org (last visited Mar. 29, 2006) 
(explaining one advocacy group’s objection to billboards). 
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surroundings,” they create unique problems for governments 
enacting zoning and land-use ordinances—problems particularly 
affecting the aesthetics of the community.7 As a result of these 
unique problems, the Supreme Court has held that governments 
may regulate the noncommunicative aspects of billboards, i.e., their 
size and location.8  
In so regulating, however, governments often run into First 
Amendment difficulties because they cannot regulate the 
noncommunicative aspects of billboards without affecting their 
communicative aspects—the speech that is located on the billboard. 
Conceptually, regulation of the noncommunicative aspects of a given 
medium of speech under a state’s police powers is unrestrained so 
long as the constitutionally protected communicative aspects of the 
expression are unaffected; practically, however, regulation of the 
noncommunicative aspects of the medium always affects the 
communicative aspects. Thus, the free speech protections of the First 
Amendment are restraints on the police powers of the state to 
regulate mediums of communication.9 As a medium of 
 7. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) (plurality 
opinion). 
 8. Id. at 502–03. The power of the state to regulate the noncommunicative aspects of 
the medium of communication is premised in the state’s police power. See, e.g., id. at 502 
(stating that “the government has legitimate interests in controlling the noncommunicative 
aspects of the medium”); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (dealing with a zoning 
ordinance affecting free speech and explaining that “[t]he police power of a state extends 
beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, 
to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community”); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–89 (1926) (holding that a municipality’s zoning ordinance was a valid 
use of the police power); see also Anne E. Swenson, A Sign of the Times: Billboard Regulation 
and the First Amendment, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 635, 639–45 (1984) (explaining the historical 
development of the police power as a power to enact zoning ordinances).  
 9. One state’s zoning manual adeptly characterized the relationship between the police 
powers that allow regulation and the constitutional protections that limit regulation as follows:  
Even if the exercise of the zoning power may be justified as a legitimate exercise of 
the police power, zoning regulations will not be enforced that unduly interfere with 
the exercise of fundamental rights protected under the U.S. . . . Constitution. The 
police power is not a universal solvent by which all constitutional guarantees and 
limitations can be loosened and set aside. Accordingly, zoning regulations have been 
invalidated in situations where the courts have found a violation of the equal 
protection clause or of the due process clause. Enforcement of zoning regulations 
has also been refused where the courts have perceived a conflict with the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech or with the developing “substantive due 
process” rights of privacy, family relations, and the like. 
MARTIN R. HEALY & JONATHAN S. KLAVENS, MASSACHUSETTS ZONING MANUAL: ZONING 
POWERS AND ITS LIMITATIONS § 2.3 (2000). This principle plays an important role in the 
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communication, billboards and signs represent a unique and messy 
intersection of First Amendment free speech interests and 
government regulatory interests. Beginning with the Court’s 
decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, courts struggling 
to determine the parameters of the free speech/regulatory 
intersection of billboards and signs have had little success in 
formulating and applying consistent, predictable rules. 
The main hindrance to the development of clear rules to govern 
the intersection of free speech and zoning power involved with signs 
and billboards is the decision in Metromedia itself: a badly fractured 
opinion that produced no majority.10 The justices failed to agree 
even on the framing of the issue, the standard of review, or the 
impact of the San Diego ordinance at issue.11 Because of the disunity 
among the Court, Metromedia “yielded only limited definitive 
principles to guide lower courts and municipalities, especially with 
regard to restrictions on non-commercial speech.”12 
Since Metromedia produced no majority opinion and consisted 
of five separate opinions that each suggested different lines of 
reasoning, courts and governments seeking a clear rule to apply to 
billboard regulations face a difficult constitutional quandary. Each 
government that seeks to enact an ordinance dealing with billboards 
and signs must consider the confusion of Metromedia and enact 
ordinances that somehow fit within the confusing guidelines of that 
decision, which is hardly a simple task. In addition, because 
Metromedia is applicable to any regulation that deals with signs in a 
community, including signs on personal property, the uncertainties 
of the decision do not end on the billboard street corner—rather, 
they extend as far as signs in one’s living-room window. 
proposal of this Comment, particularly in the ability of governments to regulate a category of 
signs this Comment characterizes as “offsite.” See infra Part V.B. 
 10. The decision itself produced five opinions but no majority opinion. There is a four-
judge plurality written by Justice White and joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion), a concurrence written by Justice Brennan 
and joined by Justice Blackmun, id. at 521 (Brennan, J., concurring), and three separate 
dissents written by Justice Stevens, id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), Chief Justice 
Burger, id. at 555 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and Justice Rehnquist, id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 11. See Mark Cordes, Sign Regulation After Ladue: Examining the Evolving Limits of 
First Amendment Protection, 74 NEB. L. REV. 36, 49 (1995). 
 12. Id. 
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The purpose of this Comment is twofold. First, it provides a 
practical summary of the current state of the law regarding billboard 
regulation by summarizing relevant Supreme Court decisions and 
noting two important lines of application of Metromedia and its 
progeny by the lower courts. Second, this Comment proposes a 
modification of the decision in Metromedia that will produce a more 
practical approach to billboard and sign regulation. 
Specifically, this Comment advocates the following modification: 
rather than placing primary emphasis on the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech to determine the 
constitutionality of sign and billboard ordinances, the Court should 
broaden the definition of “onsite” as established in Metromedia. 
Beyond including only businesses advertising on their own 
property,13 the definition of onsite should also include individual 
property owners’ signs and location-specific signs as explained by the 
Third Circuit in Rappa v. New Castle County.14 Because these types 
of signs are without suitable alternatives, a concept taken from the 
Court’s speech jurisprudence, the speech interest in these signs 
outweighs government’s regulatory interest in all but the most 
limited of circumstances. Were government to restrict these signs, 
the lack of suitable alternatives would lead to an extinguishing of the 
sign owner’s speech interest. Hence, courts should grant these signs 
heightened speech protection and apply strict scrutiny to any 
government regulation of signs that fall within this broadened 
category.  
This proposal defines all signs that do not fall within one of the 
three categories of onsite signs as “offsite” signs. An offsite sign’s 
utility is not dependent on its location because sign owners have 
alternative and effective means of communicating their message. 
Since alternatives exist, sign owners have a reduced speech interest in 
the particular sign. In the case of offsite signs, government’s 
regulatory interests outweigh the speech interest in the signs in all 
but the most limited of circumstances—a situation directly inverse to 
the constitutional/regulatory intersection in onsite signs. Therefore, 
while strict scrutiny is required when regulating onsite signs, a 
 13. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511–12 (plurality opinion). 
 14. 18 F.3d 1043, 1052–53 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 
1121(1)–(7) (1990)); see discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
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government must satisfy only rational basis scrutiny to restrict offsite 
signs, including a complete restriction of offsite signs.  
This thesis will be explored throughout this Comment, with 
particulars being fully developed in Part V. To establish the necessary 
context for this development, this Comment begins in Part II by 
reciting basic Speech Clause principles. Part III discusses the Court’s 
major billboard/sign and commercial/noncommercial speech cases, 
illustrating how the Court has developed the principles that are 
modified together in this Comment’s thesis. Part IV explains the 
major weaknesses of the Metromedia jurisprudence by focusing in 
Section A on two divergent strands of Metromedia interpretation and 
in Section B on the practical deficiencies in Metromedia’s 
onsite/offsite and commercial/noncommercial distinctions. Part V 
brings together the doctrines discussed in Parts II–IV into a 
modified Metromedia test. Part VI offers a brief conclusion. 
II. FREE SPEECH FUNDAMENTALS 
Before examining the Supreme Court’s billboard jurisprudence 
and the proposal to refine the Metromedia analysis, it is first 
necessary to recite relevant specifics involved in Speech Clause 
analysis to highlight the principles that are at play in billboard 
regulations. Despite its “absolutist language,”15 the First 
Amendment has never guaranteed an unrestrained freedom of 
speech. Consequently, the Speech Clause grants different categories 
of speech different levels of constitutional protection and grants 
some speech no protection at all.16 An understanding of what the 
Speech Clause guarantees and what it does not guarantee will 
provide the background necessary for understanding the particulars 
of the Supreme Court’s sign jurisprudence in Part III and the details 
of the proposal in Part V. 
 15. Swenson, supra note 8, at 646. 
 16. See, e.g., Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507–08 (plurality opinion) (holding that traffic 
safety and aesthetics in the community could justify infringement on commercial speech); Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957) (explaining that obscenity is not protected 
speech); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252–56 (1952) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not protect libelous speech); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509–
17 (1951) (explaining that a clear and present danger could necessitate infringement on 
speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (explaining that fighting 
words that incite breach of the peace are not protected speech); Schenk v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (explaining that free speech does not protect a right to falsely shout 
“Fire!” in a crowded theater). 
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Thus, this Section will briefly explore: (1) the requirement that 
speech regulations of fully protected speech be content-neutral and 
the resulting doctrine of time, manner, and place regulations; and 
(2) the Court’s judicial distinction between two important categories 
of speech that are at play in billboard and sign regulation, 
commercial and noncommercial speech, and the accompanying tests 
for analyzing restrictions of both types of speech. 
A. Content-Neutral Regulation 
The guiding principle in enacting regulations designed to limit 
speech that is fully protected by the Constitution17 is that the 
regulations “must have a neutral effect on speech”18; that is, 
government must not direct the regulation at the content of the 
speech but rather design the regulation to “protect governmental 
interests unrelated to speech.”19 Since the Court’s holding in Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley,20 the initial inquiry in a Speech 
Clause analysis is whether the speech regulation is content-neutral or 
content-based.21
1. Content-based regulation 
A speech regulation is content-based if it is aimed at regulating a 
particular type of speech. More specifically, content-based regulation 
might be aimed either at a particular viewpoint or, more broadly, at a 
particular subject or content. Each type of content-based regulation 
raises serious First Amendment concerns and must satisfy a strict 
scrutiny analysis to be found constitutional.22 For a regulation to 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2 for an explanation of how noncommercial speech 
is fully protected speech that is analyzed under the tests set forth in this section. 
 18. Daniel R. Mandelker, Free Speech Issues in Sign Regulation, in LAND USE 
INSTITUTE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 
159, 164 (ALI-ABA 2002). 
 19. Id. 
 20. 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). 
 21. See Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1053 (3d Cir. 1994); Cordes, 
supra note 11, at 42 (“In recent years the Court’s primary requirement has been that 
regulation of First Amendment activity be content-neutral.”); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme 
Court and Its First Amendment Constituency, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 882 (1993) (“Today the 
central organizing concept of First Amendment doctrine is the distinction between content-
based regulations and content-neutral ones.”). 
 22. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
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survive strict scrutiny, government must narrowly tailor the 
regulation to meet a compelling governmental interest and use the 
least restrictive means to achieve its objective.23 The clear 
presumption in Speech Clause analysis, therefore, is that both 
viewpoint neutrality and content neutrality are required when a 
government seeks to regulate speech. 
Viewpoint neutrality means simply that speech regulation may 
not regulate a certain point of view.24 For example, a city may not 
prohibit only speech that opposes abortion while allowing speech in 
favor of abortion. Such a regulation would clearly be directed at a 
particular viewpoint, which would necessarily make it 
unconstitutional, unless it could survive strict scrutiny or somehow 
be found to be a content-neutral time, manner, or place regulation.25
Content neutrality, on the other hand, allows government to 
restrict speech based on its noncommunicative impact. Analyzing 
whether a regulation is content-neutral involves nuanced 
considerations and can cause great difficulties in free speech analysis. 
Content neutrality stems from the Supreme Court’s assertion that 
“government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”26 Whereas 
viewpoint neutrality is concerned with regulations restricting a 
particular viewpoint, content neutrality is concerned with regulations 
restricting the content of speech.27 For example, a speech regulation 
 23. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; see also Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 
874 (1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). A further 
requirement, which is not at issue in this Comment, is that the “regulation not be overbroad 
so as to chill protected speech.” O. Lee Reed, Is Commercial Speech Really Less Valuable than 
Political Speech? On Replacing Values and Categories in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 34 
AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 14 (1996). While the overbreadth doctrine is important in many free speech 
analyses, it is not at issue in this Comment and, therefore, will not be discussed further. 
 24. Mandelker, supra note 18, at 164. 
 25. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), is an illustrative example of the Court 
upholding what arguably was a viewpoint-based regulation that prohibited approaching within 
eight feet of another person within one hundred feet of a health-care facility to protest, pass 
out leaflets, display signs, or engage in other similar behaviors. Id. at 707. The statute arguably 
applied most directly against protests at abortion clinics, id. at 708–11, and thus, arguably 
could have been characterized as viewpoint regulation. The Court rejected this argument and 
found it to be a content-neutral time, manner, place restriction. Id. at 719–25. 
 26. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
 27. The theory behind requiring content neutrality is not to allow government to 
determine which noncommercial topics are suitable for public debate: “To allow a government 
the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control 
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prohibiting any statement of any kind about abortion would violate 
content neutrality. The Supreme Court has stated that the “principal 
inquiry” in determining whether a regulation is content-neutral is 
“whether the government has adopted a regulation because of a 
disagreement with the message it conveys.”28 Absent content 
neutrality, government would be able to select topics in the public 
debate and thereby appropriate the content of the public debate to 
itself. 
2. Content-neutral regulation: time, manner, and place regulations 
Because of the serious speech concerns associated with content-
based regulations, content neutrality is almost always a requisite in 
speech regulation. The most typical form of content-neutral 
regulation is time, manner, or place regulation of speech to further 
an important governmental interest.29 These types of regulations are 
content-neutral—in theory—and seek only to regulate the “total 
quantity of speech by regulating the time, the place or the manner in 
which one can speak . . . .”30 The Supreme Court has explained that 
even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable 
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, 
provided (1) the restrictions “are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, (2) that they are narrowly tailored 
to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) that they leave 
over the search for political truth.” Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 
538 (1980), quoted in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981) 
(plurality opinion); Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1062 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 28. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citation omitted); see also 
Mandelker, supra note 18, at 164–65. But compare Hill, which illustrates that determining 
content neutrality is not an easy analysis. 530 U.S. at 719–25. Justice Scalia in dissent argued 
that “[e]ven a law that has as its purpose something unrelated to the suppression of particular 
content cannot irrationally single out that content for its prohibition.” Id. at 746 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 29. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 
(1984) (upholding regulation that prohibited the posting of political signs on public property); 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cordes, supra note 11, at 42; Mandelker, supra note 18, at 164–
65. 
 30. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1053 (emphasis added); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804–05. 
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open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”31
As this language demonstrates, the scrutiny level applicable to 
content-neutral regulations is an intermediate level of scrutiny. These 
regulations “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s 
legitimate, content-neutral interests but . . . need not be the least 
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”32
The validity of such time, manner, and place restrictions is 
premised on the idea that with these restrictions, government is not 
attempting to regulate the content of the speech but is determining 
where and how the speech will occur so as to avoid conflict with 
other important government interests.33 The Court explained that a 
“regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of 
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on 
some speakers or messages but not others.”34 For example, in Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, the Court upheld a New York City sound-
amplification guideline designed to limit the volume at an outdoor 
 31. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (numbering added)); see 
also 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 
20.47 (3d ed. Supp. 2005). 
 32. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. 
 33. See Cordes, supra note 11, at 42. 
 34. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. Professor Redish disputed the characterization of time, 
manner, and place restrictions as content-neutral and argued that “[m]any ‘time-place-manner’ 
regulations depend on the content of expression, and content-neutral restrictions may prohibit 
expression under any circumstances, and thus regulate considerably more than time, place, or 
manner.” Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 113, 114–15 (1981). Professor Redish further argued that the “opposite of time-
place-manner restriction . . . is not a content-based regulation; it is an absolute prohibition on 
expression.” Id. at 115–16. Susan Williams argued the opposite based on her reading of the 
early time, manner, and place cases:  
The language in these early cases indicates, however, that a [time, place, manner] 
regulation is distinguished primarily by its lack of content discrimination . . . . It 
regulates the circumstances of speech rather than the content of the speech. The 
“opposite” of a [time, place, manner] regulation is a content-based regulation.  
Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 
637 (1991). These arguments illustrate the divergent views of time, manner, and place 
restrictions extant in the academy. While this Comment does not seek to reconcile these 
divergent views, the language of Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council is particularly relevant to support the view of time, manner, and place restrictions 
being content-neutral. There, the Court stated that speech regulations are constitutional 
“provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they 
serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.” Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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concert venue in Central Park while providing for adequate sound 
amplification.35 The Court found that the city’s justifications for the 
guideline—controlling noise levels and preserving the character of 
the surroundings “and [their] more sedate activities”—were entirely 
unrelated to the content of the speech at the concert venue.36
Time, manner, and place regulations are not as easily applied, or 
analyzed, as it initially might appear. Two problems are particularly 
relevant to the billboard analysis in this Comment: (1) how to validly 
regulate the time, manner, and place of speech without regulating 
content—which leads directly to a problem that is conspicuous in 
billboard regulations, the “all-or-nothing” problem; and (2) leaving 
open sufficient alternative methods of communication.37
a. The all-or-nothing problem. The first problem arises because 
when a government undertakes to regulate the time, manner, and 
place of a particular type or medium of speech, billboards for 
example, it is necessarily regulating the content of the speech 
involved unless it either completely allows or completely prohibits all 
speech within the time, manner, and place regulation.38 In other 
words, “regardless of whether the state is required to accommodate 
speech in a particular place or time, once it has opened a particular 
forum to some speech it cannot exclude other speech contents”39 lest 
the government engage in choosing which topics are appropriate for 
public discourse. Thus, because of the all-or-nothing problem, many 
regulations that are thought to be content-neutral are, in reality, 
content-based. The statute in Boos v. Barry40 paradigmatically 
illustrates the point. 
There the statute prohibited signs critical of foreign governments 
within five hundred feet of any government’s embassy in Washington 
 35. Ward, 491 U.S. at 803. 
 36. Id. at 792. 
 37. Both of these concepts play major roles in this Comment, which necessitates their 
background explanation here. As will be explained infra, the all-or-nothing problem poses a 
major obstacle in enacting content-neutral time, manner, or place regulations of billboards. 
Similarly, the requirement of leaving open adequate alternative forms of communication plays a 
central role in this thesis. See infra Part V. 
 38. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that when a state 
university allowed use of its facilities for student groups to meet but denied religious student 
groups from using those facilities, the university was improperly regulating based on the 
content of speech). 
 39. Cordes, supra note 11, at 42. 
 40. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
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D.C.41 Both the respondents and the United States argued to the 
Supreme Court that this regulation was content-neutral “because the 
government is not itself selecting between viewpoints.”42 Although 
the Court agreed the statute was not viewpoint based, it rejected the 
contention that the regulation was content-neutral because only one 
category of speech (critical signs) was “completely prohibited within 
500 feet of embassies”—but all signs not critical of foreign 
governments were allowed within 500 feet of the embassies.43 
Consequently, although the regulation facially appeared to be a 
content-neutral time, manner, and place restriction of speech critical 
of foreign governments because it restricted only the location of the 
speech, the regulation was, in fact, a content-based restriction of a 
particular type of speech. If Congress wished to restrict critical 
speech within five hundred feet of foreign embassies, Congress 
would have to restrict all types of speech within the five hundred 
foot radius44—all or nothing. 
A further illustration will solidify the point. A hypothetical 
ordinance that allowed billboards to contain views only on 
abortion—a regulation nominally aimed at the manner of non-
abortion speech—would be content-based unless the city allowed all 
other types of noncommercial speech on billboards. To allow 
otherwise would permit the city to discriminate among topics of 
noncommercial speech in its regulations, a scenario the Court’s 
jurisprudence clearly prohibits because the regulation would amount 
to nothing more than a content-based discrimination.45 The essence 
of the all-or-nothing problem associated with time, manner, and 
place restrictions is that the “rule against content discrimination 
forces the government to limit all speech—including the speech the 
government does not want to limit—if it is going to restrict any 
speech at all.”46
 41. Id. at 315–18. 
 42. Id. at 319. 
 43. Id. at 318–19. 
 44. Id. at 319 (“One category of speech has been completely prohibited within 500 feet 
of embassies. Other categories of speech, however, such as favorable speech about a foreign 
government or speech concerning a labor dispute with a foreign government, are permitted.”) 
 45. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981) 
(plurality opinion) (stating that “[b]ecause some noncommercial messages may be conveyed 
on billboards throughout the commercial and industrial zones, San Diego must similarly allow 
billboards conveying other noncommercial messages throughout these zones” (emphasis added)). 
 46. Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1063 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Once a court finds that a regulation is content-based because of 
the all-or-nothing problem, the court will apply the strict scrutiny 
analysis for content-based restrictions rather than the intermediate 
scrutiny analysis for content-neutral restrictions to determine 
whether the regulation is constitutional.47 Thus, the practical effect 
of the all-or-nothing problem is that many regulations that appear to 
be content-neutral—and, therefore, require only means narrowly 
tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest—are struck 
down because they fail to meet the much more stringent standard of 
least restrictive means to meet a compelling governmental interest.48
b. Requirement of alternative channels of communication. Second, 
the Court has explained that time, manner, and place restrictions on 
speech must not only be content-neutral but also “leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.”49 This 
requirement is premised on the Court’s concern that content-neutral 
regulation of speech is not restricting the existence of the speech but 
is restricting only one manner of its purveyance to further an 
important government interest.50 An important facet involved in 
considering whether alternative channels of communication are 
available is whether other alternative channels are practically available 
or are available in theory only.51 The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that when alternative channels are not available in practice, or 
involve “more cost and less autonomy”52 than the regulated avenue 
of speech, the Court is likely to find the time, manner, and place 
restriction unduly burdensome on speech interests.53
 47. Upon finding that the statute at issue in Boos v. Barry was content-based because of 
the all-or-nothing problem, the Court applied “the most exacting scrutiny,” 485 U.S. at 321, 
and struck the statute down because it was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
governmental interest. Id. at 322–34. 
 48. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text for an explanation of the strict 
scrutiny standard for content-based regulations and supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text 
for an explanation of the intermediate scrutiny standard for content-neutral regulations. 
 49. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516 (plurality opinion) (quoting Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
 50. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). 
 51. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516 (plurality opinion); Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93. 
 52. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93. 
 53. See infra Part V for an explanation of how this judicial requirement is utilized in the 
thesis of this Comment. In particular, this Comment relies on the distinction between 
conceivable alternatives and suitable alternatives the Court set out in Linmark to help define 
the categories of onsite and offsite signs. See discussion infra Parts III.A, V.A, V.B; see also 
Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93. 
4BURT.FIN.DOC3 5/12/2006  11:17:52 AM 
473] A Method for Unweaving the Web of Metromedia 
 485 
 
In sum, the intermediate scrutiny involved in analyzing the 
constitutionality of content-neutral regulations of speech requires a 
determination that a time, manner, and place regulation is narrowly 
tailored to further an important governmental interest, that the 
regulation is content-neutral, which determination involves the all-
or-nothing analysis described above,54 and that the regulation leaves 
open suitable alternative methods of communicating the same 
speech.  
B. Commercial vs. Noncommercial Speech 
1. Distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech 
Because billboards convey both commercial and noncommercial 
speech, the next important First Amendment principle relevant to 
the billboard analysis in this Comment is the judicial distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial speech.55 The basic 
qualitative distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech is that commercial speech “promotes commercial products or 
services,”56 whereas noncommercial speech has “ideological or 
political content.”57 The Supreme Court has traditionally held that 
 54. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 55. The importance of this distinction and the reason for the explanation here is the 
rationale of the Metromedia plurality that has been relied on by subsequent lower court 
decisions that a regulation violates the Speech Clause when it allows commercial speech in 
circumstances where noncommercial speech is prohibited. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he city may not conclude that the communication of commercial 
information concerning goods and services connected with a particular site is of greater value 
than the communication of noncommercial messages.”); see also infra Parts III.B (explaining 
the Metromedia holding), IV.A (explaining lower court application of the decision). 
 56. Mandelker, supra note 18, at 162. 
 57. Id. Importantly, other categories of speech also exist but receive less protection than 
noncommercial and commercial speech. For example, sexual speech and sexual expression, 
such as nude dancing, are protected by the First Amendment, albeit to a lesser degree than 
commercial and noncommercial speech. See Barnes v. Glenn Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 
(1991); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Court has also deemed 
some types of speech completely beyond First Amendment protection. Speech falling in this 
unprotected category includes fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942), obscenity, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and false 
or misleading commercial speech, see Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
564 (1979). See also cases cited supra note 16; Reed, supra note 23, at 12–13 (explaining the 
expansion of First Amendment protection in the twentieth century). 
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the Speech Clause “was initially enacted to shield the expression of 
unfavorable political opinions from federal government 
interference”58 and, thus, has granted noncommercial political 
speech greater protection than commercial speech.59 Historically, 
noncommercial speech has been the standard example of fully 
protected speech.60
In fact, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,61 “purely 
commercial advertisements of services or goods for sale were 
considered to be outside the protection of the First Amendment.”62 
Another consideration to call attention to here is that making the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech is oftentimes an extremely difficult endeavor. Justice 
Brennan, concurring in Metromedia, explained that “our cases recognize the difficulty in 
making a determination that speech is either commercial or noncommercial.” Metromedia, 453 
U.S. at 834 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of 
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628–45 (1990) (describing and criticizing judicial 
attempts at quantifying and applying the distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech). Although examining the subtleties of this distinction is beyond the scope of this 
discussion, it is a point worth noting as it adds credence to the proposal to place primary 
emphasis not on the commercial/noncommercial distinction but on the onsite/offsite 
distinction. See infra Part V. 
 58. Swenson, supra note 8, at 646 (emphasis added); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 273–76 (1964); Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248–51 (1833) 
(explaining that the First Amendment protects only against government encroachment). 
 59. 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 
17:10 n.1 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter ZONING AND PLANNING] (explaining that the lesser 
protection accorded commercial speech “is because commercial speech which is firmly 
grounded in the profit motive, bears little relation to individual self-expression or political 
expression, interests that are normally considered fundamental to the core values protected by 
the First Amendment”). See generally Reed, supra note 23 (putting forth an argument in 
support of greater protection of commercial speech); Paul B. Stephan III, The First 
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 207–14 (1982) (explaining in 
great detail the Court’s rationale for the primacy of political speech). 
 60. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 23, at 3–15 (discussing the historical developments of free 
speech from its political speech beginnings to its multifaceted nature today); Swenson, supra 
note 8, at 646 (“The first amendment guarantee was initially enacted in order to shield the 
expression of unfavorable political opinions from federal government interference.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 61. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 62. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion); see also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are . . . clear that the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on 
government as respects purely commercial advertising.”). Some have argued that the Valentine 
decision created an otherwise unknown distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech that is nowhere to be found in the Constitution. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra 
note 57, at 627 (1990) (“In 1942, the Supreme Court plucked the commercial speech 
doctrine out of thin air.”). Justice Douglas referred to the decision as “casual, almost offhand,” 
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Such a distinction was based, at least theoretically, on the belief that 
noncommercial or political speech made up the heart of the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of a “free marketplace of ideas,”63 whereas 
commercial speech involved nothing more than “a seller hawking his 
wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain.”64 With the Court’s 
decision in Virginia Pharmacy, however, it brought commercial 
speech within the protection of the First Amendment, albeit to a 
lesser degree than noncommercial speech.65
Despite calls to abandon the distinction and treat commercial 
and noncommercial speech the same for First Amendment 
purposes66 and, conversely, calls to eliminate commercial speech 
protection altogether,67 the Court continues to “observe the 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, 
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring), and a mere 
seventeen years after its pronouncement claimed that it had “not survived reflection.” Id. 
 63. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1967) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”). 
 64. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Advocates of the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction are quick to argue that the distinction is based on the 
historical importance the Framers placed on free speech in a democracy. For example, Judge 
Kozinski, although not an advocate of the distinction, concedes that the “Framers’ 
commentary on freedom of speech focuses entirely on the importance of free speech to self-
government.” Kozinski & Banner, supra note 57, at 632. But cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 5–6 (1993) (explaining that “the principle 
of free expression is not limited to ‘political’ speech, or to expression with a self conscious 
political component”); Reed, supra note 23, at 5–6 (“Nor is there much evidence that the 
constitutional framers intended to eradicate censorship through the First Amendment. More 
likely, they wanted to limit the central government’s power over the rights of states.”); David 
Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1710 (1991). Sunstein argues 
that the “founders’ conception of free speech was a good deal narrower than ours,” SUNSTEIN, 
supra, at xiv, and that reference to the Framers’ understanding of free speech “does not reveal 
a clear-cut understanding of what speech was protected and what speech was not.” Id. 
 65. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–73 & 772 n.24. In Metromedia, the Court 
explained that in Virginia Pharmacy, it “plainly held that speech proposing no more than a 
commercial transaction enjoys a substantial degree of First Amendment protection.” 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion). However, the Court went on in Metromedia 
to explain that Virginia Pharmacy “did not equate commercial and noncommercial speech for 
First Amendment purposes; indeed, it expressly indicated the contrary.” Id.; see also Cordes, 
supra note 11, at 45 (“Although the Supreme Court . . . extended First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech, the Court made clear that commercial speech does not enjoy 
the same degree of protection as non-commercial speech . . . .”); Mandelker, supra note 18, at 
163 (“Commercial and noncommercial speech enjoy different levels of constitutional 
protection.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 57, at 651–53; Reed, supra note 23, passim. 
 67. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 64, passim. 
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indicating that the former could be forbidden and regulated in 
situations where the latter could not be.”68 This lesser protection 
manifests itself in an intermediate level of scrutiny when examining 
whether government regulation of commercial speech is 
constitutional as opposed to the content-neutral requirement when 
examining whether government regulation of noncommercial speech 
is constitutional.69
2. Judicial tests for restricting noncommercial and commercial speech 
Because the Court affords commercial speech and 
noncommercial speech different levels of constitutional protection, 
the tests it has promulgated for examining regulations of both types 
of speech vary somewhat. Although both tests are a form of 
heightened scrutiny, noncommercial speech regulation must survive 
 68. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506 (plurality opinion). See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553–56 (2001) (rejecting calls to apply a higher standard of scrutiny to 
commercial speech cases—a level of scrutiny akin to noncommercial speech cases—and holding 
that the Central Hudson test for commercial speech continues to “provide[] an adequate basis 
for decision”). See infra Part II.B.2.b for an explanation of the Central Hudson test. 
The Court has given commercial speech a lesser degree of First Amendment protection 
for a number of reasons. Some include: (1) “commercial speech is less likely to be chilled by 
regulation than other forms of speech because of economic incentives,” Cordes, supra note 11, 
at 45; see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); (2) “commercial speech is less 
central to the primary interests of the First Amendment,” Cordes, supra note 11, at 45; see also 
Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985); (3) the 
objectivity of commercial speech makes it reasonable to assume that consumers can 
independently verify the truthfulness of the commercial message, Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 
at 772 n.24; see also Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 
MD. L. REV. 55, 61 (1999); and (4) a general wariness that equating the speech protections of 
commercial speech to noncommercial speech could effectuate an attrition of the 
noncommercial speech protections, see Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506 (plurality opinion) (“To 
require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike 
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee 
with respect to [noncommercial] speech.” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 
447, 456 (1978))); Cordes, supra note 11, at 45. Judge Kozinski severely criticizes this last 
rationale and posits that this “argument seems to assume that the total amount of first 
amendment protection available for judges to draw upon is constant, so that protecting speech 
in one place will leave less protection for speech in another place where we might really need 
it.” Kozinski & Banner, supra note 57, at 648. 
 69. See Cordes, supra note 11, at 46 (stating that the Central Hudson test “suggests that 
the Court will apply a form of heightened scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, for restrictions 
on commercial speech content”); see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506 (plurality opinion) 
(“[W]e . . . have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate 
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” (quoting 
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456)). 
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a strict scrutiny analysis, unless it is a valid content-neutral 
regulation,70 while commercial speech regulation, because 
commercial speech is not fully protected, must survive an 
intermediate level of scrutiny. 
a. Restricting noncommercial speech: strict scrutiny. As stated, the 
First Amendment provides noncommercial speech more protection 
than commercial speech; consequently, government efforts to restrict 
noncommercial speech, except in the most limited of circumstances, 
are limited to content-neutral time, manner, and place restrictions.71 
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that a “content-based 
restriction on political speech in a public forum, . . . must be subjected 
to the most exacting scrutiny.”72 Hence, if a regulation is not 
content-neutral, a court will subject it to strict scrutiny and will 
almost certainly strike it down.73  
If a regulation of noncommercial speech is a content-neutral 
time, manner, or place regulation, a court will apply the intermediate 
scrutiny described above.74 The main difference between the strict 
and intermediate scrutiny is that in cases of intermediate scrutiny, the 
government interest need be only important or substantial rather 
than compelling,75 and the means need be only narrowly tailored to 
achieve the interest rather than the least restrictive means.76
 
 70. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 71. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 72. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
 73. See, e.g., id.; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). See discussion of Boos v. 
Barry, supra text accompanying notes 40–44, for an illustration of the difficulty of enacting a 
content-neutral time, manner, and place regulation without crossing over to a content-based 
regulation due to the all-or-nothing problem. But cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) 
(upholding, 6-3, a prohibition on electioneering within one hundred feet of a polling place). 
See discussion supra Part II.A for a full explanation of the content-neutral test.
 74. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 75. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–98 (1989). 
 76. Id. at 798 (“Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a 
regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve 
the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least 
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”). A point to note here is that the Court has 
also expressed the test for content-neutral regulations of noncommercial speech in terms of the 
O’Brien test for regulation of expressive conduct. In Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804–05 (1984), the Court explained that the framework for examining 
content-neutral regulations of noncommercial speech was set forth in United States v. O’Brien: 
A government regulation is sufficiently justified it if is within the constitutional 
power of the Government; it if furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
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b. Restricting commercial speech: the Central Hudson test. Because 
the Court has granted commercial speech a degree of protection 
under the First Amendment, the government is not free to restrict 
commercial speech at will. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission77 the Court articulated a four-part test to 
determine the validity of government restriction of commercial 
speech. Importantly, since commercial speech receives less 
constitutional protection than noncommercial speech, the Central 
Hudson test, rather than the content-neutral test, is the relevant 
analysis when examining any regulation of commercial speech. As 
explained in Metromedia, the test is as follows: 
(1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that 
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction 
on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) 
seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly 
advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to 
accomplish the given objective.78
This examination requires an initial inquiry into the lawfulness of the 
commercial speech before determining whether government has an 
interest in regulating the speech. Hence, implicit in the commercial 
speech protection is that the First Amendment does not protect 
commercial speech that is in any way unlawful or misleading. Justice 
Stevens explained in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island that “[i]t is 
the State’s interest in protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms’ 
that provides ‘the typical reason why commercial speech can be 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 
Id. at 805 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). The Court later 
equivocated on whether it had adopted the O’Brien test whole-cloth as its test for content-
neutral regulations of noncommercial speech when it noted that it has “held that the O’Brien 
test ‘in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or 
manner restrictions.’” Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free 
Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 85–88 (2000) (explaining that although 
they constitute two separate tests, the O’Brien test and the content-neutral time, manner, or 
place test are essentially the same). Whether the tests are the same or substantially similar only 
is immaterial to this Comment, although this Comment frames the analysis in terms of the 
content-neutrality test rather than the O’Brien test. 
 77. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 78. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (plurality 
opinion); cf. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–66. 
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subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial 
speech.’”79 
Upon overcoming this initial hurdle, the remaining three parts of 
the test involve a balancing of the purpose for the government 
regulation against the methods used to accomplish that purpose.80 
The government must have a substantial interest and use means that 
directly achieve that interest without unduly restricting the speech to 
accomplish that objective. However, in Board of Trustees of the State 
University of New York v. Fox81 the Court modified the final prong of 
the Central Hudson test and, thereby, made it clear that the 
“government may regulate commercial speech without showing that 
its regulation is necessarily the most narrowly tailored”82 to achieve 
the substantial ends. The Court explained that to survive 
constitutional scrutiny, commercial speech regulation requires a “‘fit 
between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to achieve those 
ends’—a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable . . . that 
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means 
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”83 This is clearly a 
form of heightened scrutiny—though still not approaching the level 
of strict scrutiny—that is applicable to noncommercial speech 
regulations that are content-based.84
Further, like noncommercial speech regulation, courts are 
concerned with the availability of alternative channels of 
communication in the face of the commercial speech regulation. 
While this factor is likely to be more important in noncommercial 
regulation,85 it has played a role in commercial speech regulation 
 79. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996) (quoting 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993)). 
 80. ZONING AND PLANNING, supra note 59, § 17:10 n.1 (“Although the Central 
Hudson test for the validity or restrictions on commercial speech is almost identical to the 
O’Brien test for the validity of restrictions on noncommercial speech . . . the degree of First 
Amendment protection accorded commercial speech is more limited than that extended to 
political or ideological expression.”). 
 81. 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989). 
 82. Katherine Dunn Parsons, Comment, Billboard Regulation After Metromedia and 
Lucas, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1555, 1572 (1995). 
 83. Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 480 (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism 
Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. See Cordes, supra note 11, at 46 (“This test suggests that the Court will apply a 
form of heightened scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, for restrictions on commercial speech 
content.”). 
 85. See ZONING AND PLANNING, supra note 59, § 17:10 n.2. 
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cases.86 A regulation that cuts off all avenues of commercial 
expression is likely unconstitutional.87
As will be seen in the next Part, which discusses the Supreme 
Court’s billboard and sign jurisprudence, each of the above-
described First Amendment concerns is at play in billboard and sign 
regulation. The inherent complexity of applying these various 
principles in a consistent manner is surely a factor not only in the 
Court’s own confusion in Metromedia but also in the confusion that 
Metromedia has created. Ultimately, this Comment seeks to unify 
these divergent principles in instances of billboard regulation in a 
simple yet comprehensive manner. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT CASES 
The Court has held that the guarantees of the First Amendment 
apply to sign/billboard regulation. The Court in Metromedia stated 
that “[b]illboards are a well-established medium of communication, 
used to convey a broad range of different kinds of messages.”88 The 
Court cited the California Supreme Court approvingly, explaining 
that “[t]he outdoor sign or symbol is a venerable medium for 
expressing political, social and commercial ideas. From the poster . . . 
to the billboard, outdoor signs have played a prominent role 
throughout American history, rallying support for political and social 
causes.”89 The Court, therefore, recognizes that billboards are a 
means of conveying both commercial and noncommercial ideas and 
causes, and billboards therefore clearly have a communicative aspect 
that is protected by the First Amendment.90
Nonetheless, because billboards are “designed to stand out and 
apart from [their] surroundings, the billboard creates a unique set of 
problems for land-use planning and development.”91 The physical, 
 86. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) 
(holding the prohibition of “for sale” signs on residential property unconstitutional because, 
inter alia, it did not leave open “ample channels of communication” (quoting Va. State 
Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976))). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality 
opinion). 
 89. Id. (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407, 430–31 (Cal. 
1980) (Clark, J., dissenting)). 
 90. Id. at 502. 
 91. Id. 
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noncommunicative aspect of billboards is not subject to the 
requirements of the First Amendment, and, as a result, governments 
have a “legitimate interest in controlling [this] aspect[] of the 
medium”92 through use of their police powers.93 Inherent in 
billboard regulation is the delicate balance between the protected 
communicative aspects of billboards (the messages portrayed on the 
billboard) and the noncommunicative aspects of billboards (the 
physical nature of the billboard). This balance requires “assessing the 
First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public 
interest allegedly served by the regulation.”94
As the following analysis will show, the Court has struggled to 
enunciate a clear rule to guide this delicate balancing. Rather than 
detail the facts and intricacies of the major Supreme Court cases, 
something that has been exhaustively done elsewhere,95 this 
Comment seeks only to detail the major points of analysis that have 
resulted from these cases for the purpose of both providing a quick 
summary of these points of analysis and establishing the necessary 
context for this Comment’s proposal in Part V. 
A. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro 
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,96 the 
Court considered whether an ordinance that prohibited “for sale” 
signs on individual property owners’ property unduly restricted free 
speech.97 Finding that the ordinance ran afoul of the First 
Amendment, the Court set forth two major criteria for determining 
whether a regulation is a permissible time, manner, and place 
regulation. 
First, time, manner, and place regulations must leave open 
realistic and suitable forms of communicating the information that 
 92. Id. (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 93. See Swenson, supra note 8, at 652. 
 94. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977) (quoting 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)). 
 95. For example, the holding in Metromedia has been the subject of numerous articles 
seeking to understand the plurality’s badly fractured opinion. See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 11, 
at 48–53; Stephan, supra note 59, at 244–50; Swenson, supra note 8, at 655–61; R. Douglas 
Bond, Note, Making Sense of Billboard Law: Justifying Prohibitions and Exemptions, 88 MICH. 
L. REV. 2482, 2488–2500 (1990); Parsons, supra note 82, at 1573–80; The Supreme Court, 
1980 Term—Commercial Speech, 95 HARV. L. REV. 211 (1981). 
 96. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
 97. Id. at 87–91. 
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the regulations are restricting. Although the Court recognized that 
“leaflets, sound trucks, [and] demonstrations,”98 were all available as 
alternative communication methods, the Court stressed that the only 
realistic alternatives were “newspaper advertising and listing with real 
estate agents.”99 Despite the availability of these realistic alternatives, 
the Court found they were not suitable: they were costlier, reduced 
the autonomy of the property owner, were less likely to reach 
persons “not deliberately seeking sales information,” and were 
generally less effective than “for sale” signs on the property owners’ 
property.100
Second, regulation of only a specific category of signs on a 
property owners’ property, such as “for sale” signs, is not content-
neutral. Here, the township was not attempting to regulate the 
manner or place of a type of speech—lawn signs—but was instead 
regulating the content of the speech.101 The ordinance did not 
restrict other lawn signs that would generate the same aesthetic and 
property value concerns102 as the “for sale” signs.103 The Court went 
on to reject the ordinance as a valid content-based regulation 
because the township failed to show how it directly furthered the 
goal of racial integration.104 
B. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 
Described by Justice Rehnquist as a “virtual Tower of Babel, 
from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn,”105 the 
Metromedia plurality decision remains the seminal billboard case and, 
consequently, is the starting point for any analysis of government 
 98. Id. at 93. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.; see also Cordes, supra note 11, at 47. 
 101. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93–94. 
 102. Id. at 90 (explaining the aesthetic and property value as the justifications put forth 
for the regulation). 
 103. Id. at 93–94; see also Cordes, supra note 11, at 47 (“[T]he ordinance could not be 
considered a permissible time, place, or manner restriction because it only restricted ‘for sale’ 
signs and was therefore not content-neutral. The aesthetic and traffic concerns which might 
otherwise justify the regulation of signs could not justify this restriction because the ordinance 
did not regulate signs which generated comparable concerns.” (citation omitted)). 
 104. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 94–96. 
 105. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 569 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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regulation of billboards and signs.106 The ordinance at issue in the 
decision was an attempt by San Diego to regulate billboards within 
the city. The Court explained the ordinance as follows: 
[U]nder the ordinance (1) a sign advertising goods or services 
available on the property where the sign is located is allowed; (2) a 
sign on a building or other property advertising goods or services 
produced or offered elsewhere is barred; (3) noncommercial 
advertising, unless within one of the specific exceptions, is 
everywhere prohibited. The occupant of property may advertise his 
own goods or services; he may not advertise the goods or services 
of others, nor may he display most noncommercial messages.107
Although the various opinions disagreed about most aspects of the 
decision, including the standard of review and the impact of the 
ordinance,108 when aspects of the plurality, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions are combined, Metromedia can be viewed as 
establishing three principles relating to billboard/sign regulation. 
First, seven justices, including the plurality opinion and each 
dissenting opinion, agreed that a government’s aesthetic and traffic 
safety concerns are a substantial government interest, sufficient to 
justify regulation of billboards.109 Thus, under either the time, 
manner, or place test110 for content-neutral regulations of 
noncommercial speech, or the Central Hudson test111 for commercial 
speech, aesthetics and traffic safety satisfy the requirement of a 
substantial governmental interest to justify regulation of either type 
of speech on signs and billboards.112
 106. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Sign Regulation and the First Amendment, in LAND USE 
INSTITUTE PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 
69, 72 (ALI-ABA 2000) (explaining that the plurality opinion “has been influential and 
followed by federal and state court decisions”). 
 107. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion). 
 108. See Cordes, supra note 11, at 49. 
 109. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507–08 (plurality opinion); id. at 552 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting in part); id. at 560 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
see also Mandelker, supra note 18, at 164 (noting that Metromedia is “a strong endorsement of 
aesthetics as a substantial governmental purpose that satisfies the free speech clause”); ZONING 
AND PLANNING, supra note 59, § 17:10. As will be seen infra in Part III.C., the Court 
confirmed that aesthetics are a sufficient governmental purpose in Members of City Council v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806–07 (1984). 
 110. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 111. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 112. Interestingly, numerous lower courts have held that the government’s interest in 
aesthetics is particularly substantial when it is used to protect the nature and look of a 
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Second, five justices, including the plurality and Justice Stevens, 
who dissented in part, agreed that the distinction between onsite and 
offsite commercial advertising is constitutional. Onsite signs were 
traditionally considered to be signs that “advertise goods and services 
offered at that location.”113 Naturally, offsite signs were considered 
to be signs that “advertise[d] goods and services available 
elsewhere.”114 The Court explained that “a commercial enterprise—
as well as the interested public—has a stronger interest in identifying 
its place of business and advertising the products or services available 
there than it has in using or leasing its available space for the purpose 
of advertising commercial enterprises located elsewhere.”115 The 
practical result of this distinction is that “offsite commercial 
billboards may be prohibited while onsite commercial billboards are 
permitted.”116
The final principle that the Metromedia decision announced is 
that an ordinance violates the Speech Clause when it prohibits 
noncommercial speech in locations and circumstances in which it 
permits commercial speech.117 Both the plurality and the 
concurrences support this holding.118 The plurality stressed that the 
“fact that the city may value commercial messages relating to onsite 
goods and services more than it values commercial communications 
designated historic district. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architecture 
Comm’n, 100 F.3d 175, 187 (1st Cir. 1996); Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 
1510 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A government has a more significant interest in the aesthetics of 
designated historical areas than in other areas.”); Wheeler v. Comm’r of Highways, 822 F.2d 
586 (6th Cir. 1987); Burke v. City of Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 589, 610 (D.S.C. 1995) (“A 
government has a more significant interest in the aesthetics of designated historic areas than 
nonhistoric areas.”); Pigg v. State Dep’t of Highways, 746 P.2d 961, 969 (Colo. 1987); see 
also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 533–34 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I have little doubt that some 
jurisdictions will easily carry the burden of proving the substantiality of their interest in 
aesthetics. For example, the parties acknowledge that a historical community such as 
Williamsburg, Va., should be able to prove that its interest in aesthetics and historical 
authenticity are sufficiently important that the First Amendment value attached to billboards 
must yield.”). 
 113. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511 (plurality opinion); Mandelker, supra note 18, at 167. 
 114. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511 (plurality opinion). 
 115. Id. at 512. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 513. 
 118. Id.; see ZONING AND PLANNING, supra note 59, § 17.10 (stating that “at least six 
Justices agreed that a city cannot give more favorable treatment to commercial signs than to 
noncommercial (political or ideological) signs by allowing on-site commercial signs but 
prohibiting on-site noncommercial signs”). 
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relating to offsite goods and services does not justify prohibiting an 
occupant from displaying its own ideas or those of others.”119  
The plurality’s rationale for this holding is based in the 
traditional distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech, namely, that noncommercial speech is afforded greater 
protection under the First Amendment than commercial speech.120 
Under the plurality’s reasoning, to allow restrictions on 
noncommercial speech where no similar restrictions on commercial 
speech existed would be to “invert” this traditional distinction in 
First Amendment jurisprudence.121 Thus, the plurality concluded 
that “[i]nsofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose 
to limit their content to commercial messages; the city may not 
conclude that the communication of commercial information 
concerning goods and services connected with a particular site is of 
greater value than the communication of noncommercial 
messages.”122
The result of the second and third principles explained above is 
that while government may—based on its interest in traffic safety and 
aesthetics, as well as the property owners’ and public’s interest in 
identifying the place of business—“distinguish between the relative 
value of different categories of commercial speech,”123 government 
cannot make such distinctions when dealing with noncommercial 
speech.124 It follows, then, that preferences for onsite commercial 
speech over noncommercial speech are presumptively invalid as such 
preferences are nothing more than a content-based discrimination.125
While answering some questions, the Metromedia decision does 
not answer other very significant questions, which unanswered 
impair lower courts’ analysis. The difficulty in application arises when 
one seeks to determine what the plurality’s injunction against 
favoring commercial over noncommercial speech means. For 
example, does it mean that whenever the government allows any 
commercial speech, all noncommercial speech must be allowed? Or, 
does it mean that the government simply must treat commercial 
 119. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 (plurality opinion). 
 120. See supra Part II.B. 
 121. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 (plurality opinion). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 514. 
 124. Id. at 514–15. 
 125. Id. at 516–17. 
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speech no better than it treats noncommercial speech—that is, must 
noncommercial speech be permitted under the same circumstances 
in which commercial speech is permitted?126
C. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent 
In Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,127 the Court 
considered a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited the posting of 
any sign, either commercial or noncommercial, on public property.128 
The issue before the court was whether the city’s interest in 
aesthetics and traffic safety129 justified its restriction of 
noncommercial political signs posted on public utility poles.130 The 
Court’s holding in Taxpayers for Vincent is significant because in 
addition to reaffirming and strengthening the government’s interest 
in aesthetics as a justification for restriction of both commercial and 
noncommercial speech,131 it more importantly established that so 
long as a regulation is content-neutral and leaves open ample 
alternative methods of communication, the Constitution permits 
incidental restrictions of noncommercial speech in billboards and 
signs.132 The Court stated: 
The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual’s 
freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in 
the same place where the posting of signs on public property is 
prohibited. To the extent that the posting of signs on public 
property has advantages over these forms of expression . . . there is 
no reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained 
through other means.133
This aspect of the decision is extremely important to the thesis of this 
Comment because it clearly illustrates that the Court is willing to 
uphold bans of signs and billboards containing noncommercial 
 126. See infra Part IV.A for analysis of how lower courts have dealt with this dilemma. 
 127. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
 128. Id. at 791. 
 129. Id. at 823 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Cordes, supra note 11, at 53. 
 130. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 792–93. 
 131. Id. at 805–07. The Court relied solely on the aesthetic justification in examining the 
governmental interest. Id. 
 132. See Cordes, supra note 11, at 54–55. 
 133. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 (citation and footnote omitted). 
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messages on public property when suitable alternatives of 
communication exist.134
The Court went on to reject an argument put forth by the 
appellees that the alternative forms of communication had less utility 
than posting signs on public grounds. The Court explained that 
“nothing in the findings indicates that the posting of political posters 
on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of 
communication.”135 Professor Cordes contended that this holding is 
“arguably at odds with Linmark, where the Court found alternatives 
to ‘for sale’ signs inadequate,”136 because in both cases the 
alternatives to the restricted speech were arguably costlier and less 
effective.137 Following Taxpayers for Vincent, it was, therefore, 
unclear precisely what the Court considered to be adequate 
alternative methods of communication, yet it was clear that so long 
as the alternatives existed, incidental, content-neutral restrictions of 
noncommercial speech were permitted. 
D. City of Ladue v. Gilleo 
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,138 the Court considered an ordinance 
that prohibited homeowners from displaying any sign on their 
property “except ‘residence identification’ signs, ‘for sale’ signs, and 
signs warning of safety hazards.”139 The ordinance concurrently 
allowed churches, nonprofit organizations, and commercial 
establishments to display signs that it prohibited homeowners from 
displaying.140
The Court broadly phrased the issue presented as whether the 
city “may properly prohibit [a private citizen] from displaying her 
sign, and then, only if necessary, consider the separate question 
whether it was improper for the City simultaneously to permit 
certain other signs.”141 Thus, the Court put off examination of 
content-based arguments, choosing instead to consider first whether 
the regulation, “by eliminating a common means of speaking,” 
 134. See infra Part V.A. 
 135. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812. 
 136. Cordes, supra note 11, at 55; see supra Part III.A. 
 137. Cordes, supra note 11, at 55. 
 138. 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
 139. Id. at 45. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 53. 
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simply regulated “too much speech.”142 In concluding that the 
regulation did regulate too much speech, the Court noted that, 
compared with the regulation in Linmark that had prohibited “for 
sale” signs only,143 the regulation at issue here had a far greater 
impact on free communication of ideas because it eliminated virtually 
any opportunity for homeowners to display signs on their 
property.144 The Court explained that residential signs were an 
important means of direct expression of political, religious, and 
personal messages of the homeowner,145 and that by all-but-
eliminating this important means of communication, the regulation 
restricted “too much speech.”146
Further, the Court held that no viable alternative methods of 
communication existed. The Court stated that “[r]esidential signs 
are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication,” 
that may “have no practical substitute.”147 The Court also stressed 
that signs on one’s property are often intended to reach neighbors—
an intention that is ill-replaced by other forms of communication 
such as newspaper advertisements or leaflets.148
Finally, the Court distinguished Taxpayers for Vincent, which 
upheld a broad prohibition of posting signs on public property, by 
explaining that unlike the prohibition of speech on public 
property,149 the prohibition of speech on private property had 
“almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication 
that is both unique and important.”150
This reasoning concerning the right of a property owner to 
express her beliefs was centered in the Court’s declaration that “[a] 
special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part 
 142. Id. at 55. 
 143. See supra Part III.A. 
 144. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 54. 
 145. Id. at 55–56 (“Often placed on lawns or in windows, residential signs play an 
important part in political campaigns, during which they are displayed to signal the resident’s 
support for particular candidates, parties, or causes. They may not afford the same 
opportunities for conveying complex ideas as do other media, but residential signs have long 
been an important and distinct medium of expression.” (footnote omitted)). 
 146. Id. at 54–58. 
 147. Id. at 57. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) 
(stating that putting signs on public property was not a “uniquely valuable and important 
mode of communication”); see also Cordes, supra note 11, at 56. 
 150. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 54. 
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of our culture and our law.”151 The Court went on to say that this 
“principle has special resonance when the government seeks to 
constrain a person’s ability to speak there.”152 This rationale plays a 
central part in the proposal of this Comment to adopt a broader 
definition of onsite including homeowners in expressing themselves 
on their property.153
E. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly 
The case of Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly154 deserves mentioning 
because it is a 2001 case that held that the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech is still in effect. Specifically, 
the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument to drop the Central 
Hudson test for commercial speech and apply strict scrutiny to 
commercial speech as it does to noncommercial speech.155 The Court 
stated that it saw “no need to break new ground. Central Hudson, as 
applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an 
adequate basis for decision.”156 Had the Court adopted a strict 
scrutiny analysis for commercial speech, it would have implicitly 
overruled the plurality’s holding in Metromedia because the 
plurality’s holding was premised on the traditional practice of 
affording noncommercial speech greater protection than commercial 
speech.157 It thus appears that the Court is still at least somewhat 
 151. Id. at 58. 
 152. Id. Further language is worth quoting here: 
Most Americans would be understandably dismayed, given that tradition, to learn 
that it was illegal to display from their window an 8- by 11-inch sign expressing their 
political views. Whereas the government’s need to mediate among various 
competing uses, including expressive ones, for public streets and facilities is constant 
and unavoidable . . . its need to regulate temperate speech from the home is surely 
much less pressing . . . . 
Id. 
 153. See infra Part V.A. 
 154. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 155. Id. at 554–55. 
 156. Id. (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 
173, 184 (1999)). 
 157. See supra notes 117–126 and accompanying text. For a full description of the 
Court’s holding in Lorillard, see 3 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF 
ZONING § 16:3 (4th ed. 1996). 
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comfortable with the commercial/noncommercial distinction and 
that the Metromedia principles continue to be valid.158
F. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 
Finally, while City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.159 
does not significantly add to the Court’s development of 
billboard/sign and free speech jurisprudence, it illustrates that the 
Court itself has difficulty applying the Metromedia decision. In 
Discovery Network, the Court considered a situation that mirrored 
the circumstances in Metromedia: here, the ordinance “treated 
commercial speech more severely than noncommercial speech.”160 
Cincinnati had likely designed a regulation that prohibited 
commercial news racks while permitting noncommercial news 
 158. An important point to consider here that is slightly askew from the main thesis of 
this Comment is whether the additions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will affect the 
Court’s adherence to the Central Hudson test. Certain members of the Court have appeared 
willing to abandon strict adherence to Central Hudson in past cases. Justice Thomas, for 
example has repeatedly stated that where a regulation is aimed to “keep legal users of a product 
or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace,” the Central 
Hudson test is inapplicable. Greater New Orleans Broad., 527 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 
518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). Conceivably, 
then, given the right situation, Justice Thomas would be willing to apply the same standard to 
commercial speech that is applied to noncommercial speech. A similar concern was expressed 
by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg in 44 Liquormart, where they argued that “when a 
State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for 
reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to 
depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands.” 517 U.S. at 
501 (joint opinion of Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ.). 
Also in 44 Liquormart, Justice Scalia expressed his agreement with Justice Thomas’ view 
of the Central Hudson test—which Justice Scalia characterized as having no support other than 
“policy intuition”—and his agreement with Justice Stevens’ dislike of “paternalistic 
governmental policies that prevent men and women from hearing facts that might not be good 
for them.” Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Given these views, it is possible to envision a majority of five Justices willing, in a 
particular circumstance, to modify or even replace the Central Hudson test. With the addition 
of Chief Justice Roberts replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Alito replacing Justice 
O’Connor, it is conceivable that given another opportunity, the Court might very well modify 
the Central Hudson test. Because, however, the Court has not done so, and there is no firm 
evidence that it will, this Comment approaches its analysis below on the assumption that the 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech continues to guide First 
Amendment billboard/sign analysis. 
 159. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 160. Mandelker, supra note 18, at 169–70. 
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racks161 to fall within the plurality’s opinion in Metromedia, yet the 
Court nevertheless struck the ordinance down.162 The city attempted 
to justify the distinction on the grounds that commercial speech is 
afforded less protection than noncommercial speech under the First 
Amendment.163 Importantly, the Court “rejected the argument that 
the commercial/non-commercial distinction, standing alone, was a 
valid basis for regulation where the distinction bore no relationship 
to the interest asserted.”164
Recognizing that this holding was contra to the holding in 
Metromedia, the Court attempted to distinguish the cases by 
explaining that the ordinance at issue in Metromedia did not 
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech; rather, 
the ordinance was centered only on onsite and offsite signs.165 
Relying on this interpretation, the Court noted that Metromedia did 
not hold that government could distinguish between commercial and 
noncommercial offsite billboards.166 This conclusion has been 
recognized as a flat-out misreading of Metromedia.167
Although this decision conceivably alters the Metromedia 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech in cases 
of billboard/sign regulation, the Court stressed that the holding was 
narrow: 
As should be clear from the above discussion, we do not reach the 
question whether, given certain facts and under certain 
circumstances, a community might be able to justify differential 
treatment of commercial and noncommercial newsracks [sic]. We 
simply hold that on this record Cincinnati has failed to make such a 
showing.168
Thus, it is still possible that communities can justify restrictions 
of commercial speech under the rationale that commercial speech is 
afforded less protection than noncommercial speech. Upholding 
 161. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 412–14. 
 162. Id. at 429–30. 
 163. Id. at 428. 
 164. Cordes, supra note 11, at 74. 
 165. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 425 n.20. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 11, at 75 (stating that “[a]s a practical matter, the 
Discovery majority interpretation of Metromedia is inaccurate”); Mandelker, supra note 18, at 
170 (recognizing that the Court’s “reading of Metromedia is incorrect”). 
 168. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428. 
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such a regulation would require limiting Discovery Network to its 
facts and continuing to apply the uncertain principles of 
Metromedia—something that some lower courts have already 
done.169
G. Summary of the Supreme Court Cases 
The above cases illustrate the long, tortuous path the Court has 
tread in the realm of billboard/sign regulation and the 
accompanying speech interests inherent in the analysis. The 
Metromedia decision and the three principles for which it is 
recognized—that aesthetic interests are substantial government 
interests, the distinction between onsite and offsite commercial 
advertising, and the prohibition of barring noncommercial speech 
where commercial speech is allowed170—continue to be valid law 
despite the Court’s confusing opinion in Discovery Network.171
Regarding valid time, manner, and place regulations of speech, 
including billboard/sign regulations, the Court’s decisions in 
Linmark, Taxpayers for Vincent, and Gilleo create a confusing 
precedent as to when adequate alternative forms of communication 
exist. At best, it can be said that when signs are located on one’s 
property, the Court appears unwilling to recognize substitutes both 
because of the interests of property owners in communicating their 
ideas or proposals of sale and because of the inability of substitutes to 
meet or exceed the value of having signs on one’s property.172 This 
interest does not carry over to situations involving public property.173 
Further, it seems clear that when a city attempts to restrict a certain 
type of sign on one’s property or on public property, this is facially 
unconstitutional as an invalid content-based regulation.174 Finally, 
Lorillard makes clear that despite indications to the contrary, the 
 169. See, e.g., Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 1999); Ackerley 
Commc’ns of the Nw., Inc. v. Krochalis, 108 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a 
contention that Metromedia had been superceded by subsequent cases and stating that 
“Metromedia continues to control the regulation of billboards”). 
 170. See supra Part III.B. 
 171. See supra Part III.F. 
 172. See supra Part III.D and notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
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Court is, as of yet, unwilling to abandon the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech.175
IV. METROMEDIA’S JURISPRUDENTIAL  
UNCERTAINTIES AND WEAKNESSES 
Certain governmental restrictions on signs and billboards could 
likely survive Speech Clause attack. Such restrictions would come in 
the form of content-neutral time, manner, and place regulations that 
applied to all types of signs.176 A court would analyze these 
regulations under the content-neutral balancing test set forth 
supra177—the restrictions need only be narrowly tailored to meet a 
substantial government interest and leave open suitable alternatives 
of communication.178 The problem, however, arises in the specificity 
of the regulations, such as in the San Diego ordinance at issue in 
Metromedia:179 the more detailed and specific the regulation, the 
more likely it touches on the commercial/noncommercial aspect of 
the speech, and resultantly, the more likely the regulation is 
unconstitutional. Lower courts have had little success in coming to 
unified conclusions in dealing with these types of ordinances. This 
Part first examines two different lines of lower court interpretation 
involving the commercial/noncommercial distinction and then more 
broadly explains the weaknesses of Metromedia. 
A. Two Alternate Interpretations 
Recall the dilemma put forth in the discussion of Metromedia 
above,180 namely, that the plurality’s decision in Metromedia is 
unclear as to whether it requires all noncommercial speech to be 
permitted whenever any commercial speech is permitted or whether 
it requires simply that commercial speech be treated no better than 
noncommercial speech. Numerous different interpretations in the 
 175. See supra Part III.E. 
 176. For a sampling of cases that have upheld such content-neutral regulations, see, for 
example, Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding a ban on 
all portable signs except in permitted areas); American Federal General Agency, Inc. v. City of 
Ridgeland, 72 F. Supp. 2d 695 (S.D. Miss. 1999); Donrey Communications Co. v. City of 
Fayetteville, 600 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1983). 
 177. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 178. See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra text accompanying note 107 for a description of the sign ordinance. 
 180. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text. 
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lower courts stem from this dilemma. Rather than collect each 
decision that has interpreted Metromedia, something that has been 
done in other places,181 this Comment focuses on the two alternate 
interpretations of the commercial/noncommercial distinction in 
Metromedia: (1) all noncommercial speech must be allowed 
whenever any commercial speech is allowed, or (2) noncommercial 
speech must be permitted to the same extent that commercial speech 
is allowed—an interpretation exemplified by the Rappa decision. 
1. Treat noncommercial speech better than commercial speech 
Many lower courts have interpreted Metromedia as 
constitutionally prohibiting regulations that restrict noncommercial 
signs whenever commercial signs are permitted because 
noncommercial speech must be treated better than commercial signs. 
Under this interpretation of Metromedia, courts often hold that all 
noncommercial speech must be permitted whenever any commercial 
speech is allowed because otherwise the ordinance impermissibly 
regulates the content of noncommercial speech.182 By so holding, 
these decisions illustrate the all-or-nothing problem extant in sign 
regulation.183 Thus, governments may avoid Speech Clause 
invalidation by drafting ordinances that apply only to signs 
containing commercial speech.184 Such a regulation restricts only 
commercial speech, thereby leaving noncommercial speech 
unrestricted. Some courts have upheld this type of sign regulation in 
holding that offsite sign regulations are constitutional “only when 
they are limited to signs displaying commercial messages.”185
A variation on this theme is to exclude noncommercial signs 
from the definition of offsite signs, thereby allowing regulation of 
 181. See, e.g., STEVEN G. BRODY & BRUCE E.H. JOHNSON, ADVERTISING AND 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE § 13:2.1 (2d ed. 2004); 7 MCQUILLIN 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION §§ 24:382–86 (3d ed. rev. vol. 2005). 
 182. See, e.g., Nat’l Adver. Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 556–57 (2d Cir. 
1990); Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Merriam, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1266–70 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 183. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 184. See Nat’l Adver., 900 F.2d at 556–57 (stating that municipalities have responded to 
Metromedia by allowing “noncommercial messages whenever commercial messages were 
allowed”); Outdoor Systems, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (same). 
 185. Mandelker, supra note 18, at 169; see, e.g., Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 
1110, 1112–16 (7th Cir. 1999); Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405, 
408–10 (10th Cir. 1990); R.O. Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, 294 S.E.2d 388, 391 
(N.C. App. 1983). 
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offsite signs because the regulation deals only with commercial signs. 
By excluding noncommercial signs from the definition of offsite, 
governments have more latitude to regulate offsite signs because 
such regulation does not affect noncommercial signs—in other 
words, when government regulates offsite commercial signs, by 
definition it does not regulate noncommercial signs.  
For example, in Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa,186 the 
Ninth Circuit upheld an ordinance that prohibited offsite signs but 
that excluded noncommercial signs from the definition of 
“offsite.”187 The Eleventh Circuit has taken this rationale a step 
further by holding that all noncommercial speech is, by definition, 
onsite.188 In Southlake Property Associates, Ltd. v. City of Morrow, for 
example, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “a sign bearing a 
noncommercial message is onsite wherever the speaker places it.”189 
Thus, in the Eleventh Circuit, any regulation dealing with offsite 
signs necessarily excludes noncommercial speech, and, therefore, 
noncommercial signs are unrestricted when offsite commercial signs 
are regulated.190
Some courts have taken the position that any prohibition of 
offsite noncommercial signs is unconstitutional. For example, in 
National Advertising Co. v. City of Orange,191 the Ninth Circuit 
considered an ordinance that prohibited offsite commercial and 
noncommercial signs. The court explained that the ordinance’s 
prohibition of both types of speech was unconstitutional because it 
was not affording noncommercial speech greater protection than 
commercial speech.192 Because the ordinance at issue required an 
examination of the content of the noncommercial speech to 
determine whether the speech fell within an exemption to the 
 186. 997 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 187. Id. at 608–12. 
 188. Southlake Prop. Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Morrow, 112 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (11th 
Cir. 1997). 
 189. Id. 
 190. In Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 
2004), the Eleventh Circuit upheld a municipality’s prohibition of offsite signs on the rationale 
that all noncommercial signs are by definition onsite; thus, a prohibition of offsite signs did not 
treat commercial speech any better than noncommercial speech. The court stated that “this 
Circuit has held that noncommercial messages are inherently onsite . . . whatever [their] 
location.” Id. at 1344; see also YOUNG, supra note 157, § 16:5 n.86. 
 191. 861 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 192. Id. at 248–50. 
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ordinance, the court struck the ordinance down.193 The First Circuit 
came to a similar conclusion in Matthews v. Town of Needham,194 
holding that a prohibition of all offsite signs, both commercial and 
noncommercial, was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that by 
allowing onsite signs that contained commercial messages while not 
allowing noncommercial signs, the ordinance accorded commercial 
speech greater protection than noncommercial speech.195
Finally, based on the implication in Metromedia that offsite 
commercial signs can be entirely banned, many courts have held that 
total bans on offsite commercial signs are constitutional so long as 
the ban does not unreasonably affect noncommercial speech.196
From these cases, the perpetuation of the all-or-nothing problem 
is evident: because government must treat noncommercial speech 
better than commercial speech, whenever government allows 
commercial signs it must allow all noncommercial signs lest it 
regulate the content of the noncommercial speech. Also evident is 
the lengths to which some courts will go to get around this problem, 
such as defining all noncommercial speech as onsite so as to allow 
more specific regulation of commercial speech, which these courts 
deem offsite.197
2. Treat commercial speech no better than noncommercial speech: the 
Rappa decision 
Some courts have adopted a somewhat novel interpretation of 
Metromedia that focuses not on allowing all noncommercial speech 
whenever any commercial speech is allowed but on treating 
commercial speech no better than noncommercial speech.198 
Decisions that interpret Metromedia in this way shift the focus from 
 193. Id. at 249. 
 194. 764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 195. Id. at 61 (“By giving more protection to commercial than to noncommercial 
speech, the bylaw inverts a well-established constitutional principle.”).
 196. See, e.g., Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1160–61, 1168–69 
(4th Cir. 1991); Neagle Outdoor Adver., Inc., v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 173 (4th 
Cir. 1988); Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion, 845 F.2d 653, 654–55 (6th Cir. 1988); see 
also ZONING AND PLANNING, supra note 59, § 17:11. 
 197. See, e.g., supra notes 188–190 and accompanying text. 
 198. See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994); Messer v. City 
of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992); Wheeler v. Comm’r of Highways, 822 F.2d 
586 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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the commercial/noncommercial distinction to the actual, physical 
location of the sign. 
The decision that contains the most extensive analysis of this 
Metromedia interpretation is Rappa v. New Castle County. Rappa 
involved a challenge of comprehensive state and city sign regulations 
that regulated, among other things, the posting of campaign signs 
along roadsides throughout Delaware.199 The key to the Rappa 
holding is the court’s determination that certain signs are more 
important than others not because their substantive content is more 
important than that of other signs, but because this content is more 
closely related to the particular location of the sign than that of other 
signs.200 The court in Rappa analyzed the concurring and dissenting 
opinions in Metromedia that considered the content-based 
exceptions in the San Diego ordinance de minimis in that they did 
not raise traditional concerns about content-based regulation of 
speech.201 The de minimis argument was an effort to avoid the all-or-
nothing problem inherent in time, manner, or place regulations.202 
Persuaded by language in Justice Brennan’s concurrence,203 the 
Rappa court stressed that “when government has a significant 
interest in limiting speech that is unrelated to the content of that 
speech, government should not be left with a choice of enacting a 
 199. 18 F.3d at 1048–49. 
 200. Id. at 1064. 
 201. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1063–64. 
 202. Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan argued, in slightly different ways, that a city 
should be allowed to make such content-specific time, manner, and place restrictions if the 
impact of such restrictions were de minimis. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 
U.S. 490, 553 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 532 (Brennen, J., concurring in 
the judgment). Justice Stevens argued that “[t]he essential concern embodied in the First 
Amendment is that government not impose its viewpoint on the public or select topics on 
which public debate is permissible.” Id. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). If the content-
based discrimination in a time, manner, or place regulation does not result in government 
selecting the topics of public debate or imposing its own view, Justice Stevens would argue 
that the regulation’s content-based effect on speech is likely de minimis and, therefore, 
permissible. Justice Brennan similarly felt that the binary choice between banning all speech or 
none is poor policy in evaluating time, manner, and place regulations; consequently, he 
likewise felt that de minimis regulations should be allowed. Id. at 532 (Brennan, J., concurring 
in the judgment). Although five Justices agreed that de minimis content-based regulations are 
perhaps allowable, the five did not agree on the analysis and the decision was not based on this 
rationale. Thus, the de minimis rationale carries no force of law. See Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1057–
60, for a detailed explanation of why the opinions do not add up to a rule of law from the 
majority of the Court. 
 203. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 532 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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regulation banning all signs in a particular geographic location or 
none.”204
However, rather than adopting a de minimis test, which the 
Metromedia Court had not done, the Rappa court went on to hold 
that 
when there is a significant relationship between the content of 
particular speech and a specific location or its use, the state can 
exempt from a general ban speech having that content so long as 
the state did not make the distinction in an attempt to censor 
certain viewpoints or to control what issues are appropriate for 
public debate.205
By allowing location-specific exceptions to general bans so long as 
the exception is viewpoint neutral and does not determine the 
content of public debate, the court avoided the concerns that 
underlie the prohibition on content-based restrictions of speech, 
namely, that a government not determine the content or discourse of 
public debate.206 The court explained that allowing location-specific 
exemptions to general bans “is not discriminating in favor of the 
content of these signs; rather, it is accommodating the special nature 
of such signs so that the messages they contain have an equal chance 
to be communicated.”207
This holding is consistent with the Metromedia mandate to treat 
commercial speech no better than noncommercial speech. The 
Rappa decision would allow a complete ban of offsite signs with 
exceptions for onsite signs irrespective of their commercial or 
noncommercial content. Such a regulation does not prefer 
commercial to noncommercial speech because all speech that occurs 
offsite is prohibited. Thus, Rappa interprets Metromedia as requiring 
only that noncommercial speech be allowed in the same 
circumstances in which commercial speech is allowed.208
 204. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064. 
 205. Id. at 1065. 
 206. See supra Part II.A.1. Justice Stevens, dissenting in part in Metromedia, explained 
that “[t]he essential concern embodied in the First Amendment is that government not impose 
its viewpoint on the public or select the topics on which public debate is permissible.” 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 207. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064. 
 208. The Rappa court stated this principle thus: 
[I]f the Metromedia plurality meant to indicate that a statute that allowed any 
commercial speech could not prohibit any non-commercial speech, then the statute at 
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B. Weaknesses in the Current Approach to Sign Regulation 
A final point necessary to establish the necessity and workability 
of the proposal of this Comment is the weaknesses inherent in an 
application of the uncertain principles of Metromedia. Specifically, 
this Section will mention the shortcomings of the current 
onsite/offsite distinction and the heavy reliance on the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction. 
1. The current onsite/offsite distinction 
The most obvious weakness of the current onsite/offsite 
distinction as explained in Metromedia209 is that it fails to take into 
account individual property owners’ interest in posting signs on 
their own property. As discussed above,210 the Court has twice 
struck down ordinances that restricted homeowners’ ability to post 
both commercial211 and noncommercial212 signs on their property. 
issue here would fail the test. But we interpret the Metromedia plurality to be 
concerned with the fact that the San Diego ordinance allowed a broad type of 
commercial speech (onsite speech) while not allowing non-commercial speech even of 
the same type. 
Id. at 1056; see also Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1509–10 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that an offsite prohibition is viewpoint neutral because it “regulates signs not based 
on the viewpoint of the speaker, but based on the location of the signs”); Wheeler v. Comm’r 
of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the offsite prohibition of signs 
is “content neutral. They are not directed at the content of the messages, but at their 
secondary effects”). 
A final point worth mentioning about Rappa is that Justice Alito joined in the majority 
opinion while sitting as a circuit judge on the Third Circuit. See Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1079–80 
(Alito, J., concurring). Then-Judge Alito stressed that although he would use a slightly 
different, and more simplified, means of analysis if he were sitting alone, he joined in both the 
judgment and the reasoning of the majority opinion. Id. at 1079 (Alito, J., concurring). 
Importantly, Judge Alito was quite unsure about whether the limited exceptions in the statute 
rendered the statute content-based and stated that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court provides 
further guidance concerning the constitutionality of sign laws,” he joined in the majority 
opinion. Id. at 1080 (Alito, J., concurring). Thus, whether Justice Alito, now sitting on the 
Supreme Court, is willing to employ the full Rappa analysis regarding the limited exceptions to 
an otherwise constitutional ban is unclear, although this Comment argues that he should. See 
infra Part V. 
 209. See  Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511 (plurality opinion); Mandelker, supra note 18, at 
167. 
 210. See supra Part III.A, D. 
 211. Recall that in Linmark, at issue was an ordinance that prohibited “for sale” signs on 
individual’s property. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
 212. In Gilleo, at issue was an ordinance that prohibited all types of “lawn signs” with a 
few exceptions. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
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The rationale of these decisions is that a homeowner has a unique 
interest that comes from “[a] special respect for individual liberty in 
the home [that] has long been part of our culture and our law.”213 
When a government seeks to restrict a homeowner’s ability to speak 
on her own property, including speech in the form of a commercial 
or noncommercial sign, this “special respect for individual liberty in 
the home” has “special resonance.”214
The Court in Metromedia focused solely on commercial signs 
when it held that “a commercial enterprise—as well as the 
interested public—has a stronger interest in identifying its place of 
business and advertising the products or services available there 
than it has in using or leasing its available space for the purpose of 
advertising commercial enterprises located elsewhere.”215 
Restricting the onsite/offsite distinction, however, to only 
commercial speech fails to consider the implications of Taxpayers 
for Vincent and Gilleo.  
Recall that while Taxpayers for Vincent upheld an ordinance 
prohibiting the posting of political signs on public property,216 the 
Court in Gilleo had found unconstitutional a restriction of most 
types of signs on private property.217 In Gilleo, the Court 
distinguished the two holdings by explaining that whereas the 
prohibition of political signs on public property had left open 
ample alternative means of communicating in Taxpayers for 
Vincent,218 the prohibition on lawn signs in Gilleo “almost 
completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is 
both unique and important.”219 The Court concluded that no 
suitable substitute exists for the unique communicative interest of 
property owners in displaying signs on their own property, an 
interest that is not present on public property or anywhere else off 
of the property owner’s property.220 In contrast, the Court in 
 213. Id. at 58. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (plurality 
opinion); see also supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text. 
 216. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); see also 
supra Part III.C. 
 217. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 47. 
 218. 466 U.S. at 812. 
 219. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 54. 
 220. Id. at 57; see also supra Part III.D. 
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Taxpayers for Vincent said, “[N]othing in the findings indicates that 
the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely 
valuable or important mode of communication . . . .”221 According 
to Gilleo, just the opposite is true with signs on homeowners’ 
property. 
Thus, not only do business owners have a stronger interest in 
identifying their place of business through onsite signs than offsite 
signs, but individual property owners generally have a stronger 
interest in portraying both commercial and noncommercial 
messages on their own property—onsite—than they do in 
portraying similar message on other’s property—offsite. The 
current Metromedia analysis fails to take this distinction into 
account. 
2. The current commercial/noncommercial distinction 
The most obvious weakness of the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction as applied to billboard and sign regulation in 
Metromedia222 is that it is confusing for lower courts to apply this 
distinction.223 The Court’s holding in Metromedia, that the Speech 
Clause is violated whenever commercial speech is allowed in a 
context where noncommercial speech is not allowed, creates a 
dilemma as to its meaning: Does it mean that all noncommercial 
speech must be allowed whenever any commercial speech is 
allowed? Or does it mean that commercial speech simply cannot be 
preferred to noncommercial speech?224
The first interpretation—that all noncommercial speech must 
be allowed whenever any commercial speech is allowed—has 
proven to be the more popular option, despite the fact that it 
perpetuates the all-or-nothing problem inherent in the ban on 
content-based discrimination.225 Thus, even when a government 
has a significant interest in regulating signs in a given area, 
independent of the content of the sign, that government is often 
forced to either ban all signs in the area or ban none.226 Further, a 
 221. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 (emphasis added). 
 222. See supra notes 117–122 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 224. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.  
 225. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 226. See Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1064 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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government cannot enact limited noncommercial sign exceptions 
to a general ban on signs in a particular area where any commercial 
sign exceptions exist; rather, a government must allow all 
noncommercial signs in the area, even if they go against the 
substantial government interest in aesthetics and traffic safety.227 
Therein lies the major weakness of placing heavy emphasis on the 
commercial/noncommercial speech distinction: it fails to 
adequately take into account government’s regulatory interests. 
V. PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF METROMEDIA 
While sitting as a circuit judge in Rappa,228 then-Judge Alito 
queried whether “exceptions for ‘for sale’ signs and signs relating 
to onsite activities render” an otherwise general ban of signs 
content-based.229 Poignantly summing up the state of billboard and 
sign law, Judge Alito stated that “[t]here is no easy answer to this 
question.”230 The following proposal puts forth an answer to this 
question that ties together the loose strands of First Amendment 
jurisprudence as applied against government’s regulatory interest in 
zoning for billboards and signs. The proposal is as follows: rather 
than scrapping Metromedia and beginning anew, Metromedia 
should be modified by redefining what is meant by onsite and 
offsite, thereby allowing primary emphasis in the billboard 
regulation analysis to be placed on the onsite/offsite distinction. 
Specifically, the meaning of onsite should be broadened from 
including only signs that “advertise goods and services sold on the 
premises”231 to also include signs on individual property owners’ 
property and Rappa location-specific signs. The unifying element 
of these three sign types is that their utility—their expressive 
value—is derived from location: by restricting any of these signs, 
government forecloses the speech interest of the property owner 
 227. Recall that the Court in Metromedia clearly held that government’s interest in 
aesthetics and traffic safety is a substantial interest. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 
U.S. 490, 507–08 (1981) (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 109–112 and accompanying 
text. 
 228. Justice Alito concurred in both the outcome and reasoning of the Rappa decision 
while sitting on the Third Circuit. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1079–80 (Alito, J., concurring); see also 
supra note 208 (explaining Judge Alito’s concurring opinion and what it could portend for 
future billboard cases). 
 229. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1080 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Mandelker, supra note 18, at 167. 
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because the owner lacks suitable alternatives. Therefore, 
government should be required to overcome strict scrutiny to 
restrict signs falling within this broadened category of onsite.  
This proposal defines offsite signs simply as everything else, or, 
more descriptively, offsite signs are signs whose utility is not 
dependent upon their location, from which it follows that suitable 
alternatives to such signs are necessarily available. Because of the 
availability of suitable alternatives, the speech interest in offsite 
signs is much less than the speech interest in onsite signs; 
consequently, the First Amendment does not restrict government’s 
zoning power nearly as much as in the case of onsite signs. 
Government therefore need only satisfy a rational basis scrutiny to 
restrict this newly defined category of offsite signs—even a total 
restriction need only satisfy rational basis scrutiny because the 
purveyor of the speech on the offsite signs has suitable alternatives 
of expression. 
Importantly, this modification of Metromedia moves away from 
the problematic commercial/noncommercial distinction that plays 
so large a role in the current analysis.232 However, because the 
Supreme Court has expressed its intention to continue to apply the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction,233 the modified onsite/ 
offsite analysis still takes into account the commercial/ 
noncommercial distinction; it simply does not place primary 
emphasis on that distinction. This proposal further argues that 
Metromedia should be understood as mandating that commercial 
speech be treated no better than noncommercial speech as opposed 
to allowing all noncommercial speech whenever any commercial 
speech is allowed. 
A. Defining Onsite Signs 
The definition of onsite signs should be broadened from its 
current definition of signs that “advertise goods and services sold 
on the premises”234 to include signs on individual property owners’ 
property and location-specific signs.235 The unifying factor among 
these types of signs is that their utility is dependent upon their 
 232. See supra Parts III.B, IV.A. 
 233. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001); supra Part III.E. 
 234. Mandelker, supra note 18, at 167.  
 235. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
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location—in any other location the communicative value of the 
speech is greatly reduced and, therefore, the speech interest of the 
speaker is greatly diminished, if not extinguished.236 Because of the 
risk of extinguishing one’s speech interest in cases of onsite signs, 
the First Amendment poses a substantial barrier to government 
zoning power. The definition of suitability under this proposal is 
borrowed from the Court’s suitability standard put forth in 
Linmark—namely, that the alternative must be in practice a 
suitable form of communication that does not affect the ability of 
the speaker to communicate the message.237 To illustrate, consider 
the following language from Linmark discussing alternatives to “for 
sale” signs on individual property owner’s property: 
 Although in theory sellers remain free to employ a number of 
different alternatives, in practice realty is not marketed through 
leaflets, sound trucks, demonstrations, or the like. The options to 
which sellers realistically are relegated—primarily newspaper 
advertising and listing with real estate agents—involve more cost 
and less autonomy than "For Sale" signs; are less likely to reach 
persons not deliberately seeking sales information; and may be 
less effective media for communicating the message that is 
conveyed by a "For Sale" sign in front of the house to be sold. 
The alternatives, then, are far from satisfactory.238
Thus, factors such as cost, autonomy of the purveyor of the speech, 
effectiveness at reaching the intended audience, and effectiveness at 
communicating the message are all relevant factors in determining 
the suitability of an alternative. As in the case of the “for sale” signs 
at issue in Linmark, in the case of the three categories of onsite 
signs under this proposal, there exists no suitable alternative. 
Consider each category. 
First, the decision in Metromedia recognized that there is a 
greater speech interest in communication via a sign or billboard 
 236. This rationale functions pari passu with the Court’s reasoning in Linmark Associates, 
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, where the Court held that although some alternatives might be 
available, if they were not suitable the regulation was invalid. 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). Thus, 
hypothetical availability is not the standard whereby to judge alternative methods of 
communication; the standard, rather, is one of practical availability. 
 237. Id.; see also discussion supra accompanying notes 98–100. 
 238. Linmark Assoc., 431 U.S. at 93 (emphases added) (citations omitted); see also supra 
Part II.A.2.b; discussion supra accompanying notes 98–100. 
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when it identifies a place of business239 than when it is an 
advertisement on another’s property. A sign on a business’s 
property identifying that property as the place of business has no 
suitable alternative because a sign on any other location is clearly 
less effective at identifying the location of the business. Further, the 
cost of using signs on other’s property would far exceed the cost of 
using a sign on the business’s property. Finally, signs on another’s 
property likely would be less effective at reaching the intended 
audience—potential customers—because the potential customers 
will likely not be searching for the business when they see the signs. 
Thus, a business has a stronger speech interest in erecting a sign 
advertising the goods or services offered on its premises than in 
communicating the same interest on another’s property. This 
Comment’s proposal agrees with Metromedia’s reasoning and 
continues this traditional definition of onsite. 
Second, the definition of onsite should take into account the 
same interest inherent in individual property owners,240 namely that 
they have a unique speech interest in speaking as they wish on their 
own property. Including individual property owners’ signs in a 
definition of onsite takes into account the decisions in Linmark and 
Gilleo, which held that there is a heightened speech interest when 
one is speaking or displaying a sign on one’s own property because 
no suitable alternative is available. By including individual property 
owners in the definition of onsite, this proposal cures the defect in 
the current onsite/offsite distinction—namely that it does not 
include individual property owners, whose speech interest in 
portraying signs on their own property is equivalent to the speech 
interest of businesses in portraying signs on their property.241
Finally, the Rappa location-specific test should be included in a 
definition of onsite because the speech interest in these signs 
 239. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (plurality 
opinion); see also supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text. 
 240. This Comment uses the term “property owner” to signify locations of residence or 
business, regardless of whether the residence is rented or owned outright, or if the business 
location is leased or owned outright. Signs at the place of residence and the place of business 
are onsite because there are no suitable alternatives for the person occupying the property, be it 
an owner or a renter, to convey the information on the sign. Thus, both the actual owner of 
the property and the renter have heightened speech protection to place signs on the property. 
However, if one were to lease a sign on property that is not the place of residence or business, 
this proposal would classify the sign, by definition, as an offsite sign. 
 241. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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likewise depends on their location. Specifically, “when there is a 
significant relationship between the content of particular speech 
and a specific location or its use,”242 the sign conveying that 
content should be considered onsite. As described earlier, the 
underlying rationale of this rule is that such signs’ utility is derived 
from the location; in another location, the signs’ utility is greatly 
reduced.243 An example given by the Rappa court illustrates this 
principle: 
A sign that says “Speed Limit 55” or “Rest Stop” is more 
important on a highway than is a sign that says “Rappa for 
Congress.” A sign identifying a commercial establishment is more 
important on its premises than is a sign advertising an unrelated 
product. If the former signs are banned from the highway or the 
place of business, there is no other means of communication that 
can provide equivalent information. In contrast, placing a sign 
that says “Rappa for Congress” or “Drink Pepsi” on a highway, 
while it may be an important means of communication because of 
the number of travelers on the highway, has no relationship to the 
property on which it is placed or to the fact that it is next to a 
highway. Banning these signs potentially leaves many alternative 
means of communicating the same information.244
 The Rappa court stated that government can demonstrate that 
a sign’s utility is dependent on its location in one of two ways. 
First, directional signs along a road are useful only if allowed along 
the road.245 An exit sign does a driver no good unless it directs the 
driver to the actual exit. Second, and more broadly, if government 
can show “that a sign better conveys its information in its particular 
location than it could anywhere else,” the sign is dependent upon 
its location.246 This method of showing location dependence could 
theoretically consume the current view of onsite, which is that 
businesses have an interest in advertising on their own property 
because the sign’s utility is derived from the fact that it is 
advertising the location of the business. 
To restate, the commonality of all three types of onsite signs 
under this proposal is that no suitable and practical alternative form 
 242. Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1065 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 243. See supra Part IV.B; see also Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064–65. 
 244. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064. 
 245. Id. at 1065. 
 246. Id. 
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of communication exists for each of these signs.247 As explained by 
the Court in Linmark,248 Taxpayers for Vincent,249 and Gilleo,250 if 
there is no suitable alternative available when a government seeks 
to enact a time, manner, and place restriction, the restriction is 
invalid. This proposal takes this rationale to its logical conclusion: if 
there is no suitable alternative for a type of sign, that sign should be 
granted strict scrutiny protection. The speech interest in the 
particular sign outweighs the government’s regulatory interest in 
zoning in all but the most limited of circumstances because each of 
the three categories in the proposed onsite category is a type of 
sign that has no practical substitute; a government restriction of the 
sign would likely extinguish the speech interest of the sign owner. 
An important consideration here concerns content neutrality. 
Although the proposal appears, at first blush, to favor certain types 
of signs based on their content (i.e., identifying place of business, 
speech of property owners), the proposal in fact does not favor 
signs based on content. As the Rappa court explained, 
Some signs are more important than others not because of a 
determination that they are generally more important than other 
signs, but because they are more related to the particular location 
than are other signs. Allowing such “context-sensitive” signs 
 247. First, a sign that is located on the actual property of the business cannot be replaced 
with a sign located elsewhere advertising the location of the business without losing utility. See 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (plurality opinion). Second, 
an individual property owner’s lawn sign cannot be replaced with a newspaper advertisement or 
leaflet without losing utility. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54–56 (1994); Linmark 
Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). Finally, a location-specific sign, 
such as a speed-limit sign or an exit sign, cannot be relocated without losing utility. See Rappa, 
18 F.3d at 1064. Included within such location-specific signs would be logo signs and so-
called tourist-oriented directional signs (TODS). See Scenic America, Billboard Control is 
Good for Business!, http://www.scenic.org/Portals/0/Fact%20Sheet%20%20Billboard%20 
Control%20is%20Good%20for%20Business.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) [hereinafter 
Billboard Control]. Logo signs include advertisements for “gas, food, camping, and lodging at 
nearby highway exits.” Id. “TODS appear on non-interstate highways to supply information 
about local tourist attractions, such as distances and directions.” Id. These would be included 
within the Rappa location-specific category because there are no other suitable means of 
advertising the information on the signs. For example, the only way to know a gas station is at 
the next exit on a highway before passing the exit is with a sign announcing the presence of the 
gas station at that exit. Naturally, the gas station’s sign on its premises would likewise fall 
within the onsite category and would be protected. 
 248. See supra Part III.A. 
 249. See supra Part III.C. 
 250. See supra Part III.D. 
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while banning others is not discriminating in favor of the content 
of these signs; rather, it is accommodating the special nature of 
such signs so that the messages they contain have an equal chance 
to be communicated.251
A ban on the three categories of onsite signs included in this 
proposal would all but eliminate the possibility of communicating 
the information on the signs. Thus, the proposal is not suggesting 
that these signs should be favored because of their content, but is 
suggesting that these signs should be favored because otherwise the 
speech interest in the sign is abolished. It follows that a regulation 
that exempts these types of signs from an otherwise general ban on 
signs is not content-based, and, therefore, the all-or-nothing 
problem does not arise when creating exceptions from a ban for 
onsite signs.252
B. Defining Offsite Signs 
Offsite signs by definition constitute signs that have suitable 
alternative forms of communication in the face of government 
regulation, as opposed to onsite signs, which have no such suitable 
alternative forms of communication. The utility of the offsite sign is 
not dependent upon its location, and, therefore, the speech interest 
in offsite signs is not as great as the speech interest in onsite signs: 
substitutes are interchangeable and generally just as effective as the 
offsite sign at communicating the information. This proposal is not 
arguing that there is no utility in the location of the offsite sign—
billboards along a highway are clearly valuable commodities to 
businesses that purchase billboard space—rather, it is simply 
arguing that there is adequate utility for the message on the offsite 
sign via an alternative method of communication, and the speaker, 
therefore, is not reliant upon the sign to communicate the speaker’s 
 251. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064. 
 252. Rappa explained this idea as follows: “when there is a significant relationship 
between the content of particular speech and a specific location or its use, the state can exempt 
from a general ban speech having that content so long as the state did not make the distinction 
in an attempt to censor certain viewpoints or to control what issues are appropriate for public 
debate.” Id. at 1065. In other words, when issues at the heart of the prohibition of free speech 
are at issue, such as the government choosing which topics are appropriate for public debate or 
deciding to regulate a particular viewpoint, see supra Part II.B.1, the exemption for onsite signs 
would become content-based, and, consequently, unconstitutional. See infra Part V.C for a 
fuller discussion of how government regulation would work under this proposal. 
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message. A business may very well value the billboard space along a 
busy highway for advertisement, but that business has many 
suitable and practical alternatives for advertisement such as radio, 
television, newspaper, and magazine advertisements that could be 
just as effective at reaching the target audience without necessarily 
incurring significant additional costs.253 Consequently, under this 
proposal government may more easily regulate these signs than it 
can onsite signs. Government’s regulatory interest in zoning 
outweighs the interest in communicating via the offsite sign 
because the speech interest of the speaker is not dependant on the 
sign; therefore, the First Amendment does not restrict the 
regulatory power nearly as much as is the case with onsite signs. 
Thus, government need only satisfy a rational basis standard to 
regulate offsite signs, even to regulate a total ban on offsite signs 
with exceptions for onsite signs, and the presumption is that the 
regulation is constitutional. 
Specifically, because this proposal advocates that Metromedia 
requires only that noncommercial speech be permitted in the same 
circumstances as commercial speech, government could 
constitutionally prohibit all offsite signs. In such a restriction, 
government is not treating commercial speech any better than 
noncommercial speech: all speech relating to offsite activities is 
prohibited. Such a prohibition would also survive the requirement 
of suitable alternative forms of communication because the 
definition of offsite under this proposal is a sign with a suitable 
alternative. Governments could enact content-neutral measures less 
extreme than complete prohibition of offsite signs so long as the 
regulations did not favor commercial over noncommercial speech. 
To illustrate what this proposal considers an offsite sign to be, 
consider the political campaign posters in Taxpayers for Vincent.254 
There, the Court held that political campaign posters on public 
 253. See, e.g., Billboard Control, supra note 247 (explaining how logo-signs and TODS 
function as alternatives for more intrusive billboards and debunking the notion that restrictions 
on billboards, by necessity, hurt businesses that would otherwise advertise via billboards). This 
proposal leaves open the possibility that in a fact-finding situation, a court or a jury could find 
that what appears to be an offsite sign with suitable alternatives in reality lacks suitable 
alternatives and, therefore, is an onsite sign. If the sign, however, does not fall within one of 
the three categories of onsite signs described supra in Part V.A, the burden of proof is on the 
party utilizing the sign to portray a message to demonstrate that no suitable alternatives exist 
and, thus, that the speech interest is dependent upon the sign. 
 254. 466 U.S. 789 (1984); see supra Part III.C for the full explanation of the case. 
4BURT.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006  11:17:52 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
522 
 
property were not a unique form of communication.255 According 
to the Court, the value of political posters on public property was 
easily replaced by other forms of communication.256 Thus, the 
political posters on public property would be offsite signs for 
purposes of this proposal and government can validly prohibit them 
consistent with the decision in Taxpayers for Vincent. 
Recall Project Billboard’s national billboard campaign discussed 
in the Introduction.257 The anti-war message of these billboards is 
clearly noncommercial speech. Nevertheless, under this proposal, 
these billboards would be classified as offsite signs because there are 
readily available alternatives for communicating the same message. 
The Project’s stated goal is to increase national attention on their 
cause,258 which they could do just as effectively by spending money 
on television and radio spots, national mailers, or other similar 
forms of communication. Thus, government could restrict these 
billboards so long as it likewise restricted similar commercial uses of 
billboards. 
This proposal would allow government to restrict both 
commercial and noncommercial billboards along a highway, for 
example, because these billboards would have suitable alternatives 
at communicating the same information. However, government 
would not be allowed to completely restrict offsite political 
billboards while allowing offsite commercial billboards because 
such a restriction would favor commercial over noncommercial 
speech contrary to Metromedia’s prohibition. So long as offsite 
commercial signs are treated no better than offsite noncommercial 
signs, government could regulate the signs to any degree from no 
regulation to complete prohibition, subject only to a court’s 
rational-basis inquiry. 
C. Regulations of Signs and Billboards Under the Proposal 
This proposal is not advocating that governments should be 
allowed willy-nilly to pick and choose which types of signs to 
regulate and which types of signs to leave unregulated; similarly, 
this proposal is not asserting that governments are free to restrict 
 255. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 258. See Project Billboard, supra note 1. 
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offsite billboards at will without any sort of constitutional scrutiny. 
At its core, this proposal focuses on distinguishing between speech 
interests that are irreplaceable with those that have suitable 
alternatives, and asserts concomitantly that while regulations 
restricting the former should be presumed unconstitutional, 
regulations restricting the latter should be presumed constitutional. 
Because the focus of the inquiry is on the dependency of the speech 
interest on the location of the sign rather than on the content of the 
speech, the proposal is not content-based. The proposal examines 
the content of the sign only for the limited purpose of determining 
whether it bears a relation to the location of the sign (the business’s 
location, the individual’s property, and a Rappa-type location) and 
allows for the exception of onsite signs from otherwise general bans 
of offsite signs. Thereby, this proposal cures the all-or-nothing 
problem that currently plagues courts seeking to apply 
Metromedia259 because government may enact general bans of 
offsite signs, subject to rational-basis scrutiny, while allowing 
specific exceptions for onsite signs. 
Consider now how government may regulate onsite signs. 
Because regulations restricting onsite signs are presumed 
unconstitutional, a strict scrutiny analysis is necessary when 
government seeks to regulate these signs. The only compelling 
governmental interests, as explained by Metromedia, that could 
outweigh the First Amendment speech interest in these onsite signs 
are government’s interests in aesthetics and traffic safety.260 
Therefore, to enact a valid content-neutral time, manner, and place 
restriction of onsite signs, the government would have to show that 
its interest in aesthetics is compelling in the particular circumstance 
and that it is using means that are the least restrictive means to 
achieve that objective. Consequently, to survive strict scrutiny, a 
regulation of an onsite sign could not prohibit its existence. Rather, 
it could deal only with the size, onsite location, or potentially the 
 259. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 260. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511 (plurality opinion). Other compelling objectives 
could theoretically exist, but this analysis is limited to these objectives because they are the only 
ones the Court has identified as compelling. The Court has repeatedly held that these interests 
are sufficient to justify either the strict scrutiny test for regulation of noncommercial speech, see 
id. at 507–08; Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805–07 
(1984), or the Central Hudson test for regulation of commercial speech, see Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001); see also supra Part III.E. 
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time in which the sign could be displayed. In this way, 
government’s interest in aesthetics could still be considered. 
Note that whether a sign is commercial or noncommercial plays 
no role in the analysis to this point: all onsite signs, both 
commercial and noncommercial, are granted strict scrutiny. 
However, because the Court still adheres to the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction,261 this proposal does the 
same.262 The distinction would come into play if government were 
to enact a regulation that restricted a noncommercial onsite sign 
while not restricting a commercial onsite sign. This proposal adopts 
the view of Metromedia that noncommercial speech must simply be 
allowed in the same circumstances and contexts as commercial 
speech.263 For example, a regulation that mandated that political 
signs on one’s lawn could be no larger than a certain size but 
allowed “for sale” signs to be any size would have difficulty 
surviving Metromedia’s prohibition on preferring commercial to 
noncommercial speech. Similarly, a regulation that limited the 
number of political signs on one’s property while not limiting the 
number of “for sale” signs would be invalid as preferring 
commercial over noncommercial speech. 
This proposal also resolves a problem with the traditional 
onsite/offsite distinction that has been explained elsewhere,264 
namely that it allows government to prefer commercial over 
noncommercial speech. For example, the traditional onsite/offsite 
distinction allows a business owner to advertise its business on its 
property, but the government may prohibit noncommercial signs 
on that property.265 This proposal cures this defect by allowing all 
types of speech on onsite signs, subject to strict scrutiny. This 
recognizes that a business may wish to convey a political position, 
but might not have suitable alternatives of conveyance other than 
an onsite sign. For example, a steel mill’s posting of a sign 
 261. See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 554–55; see also supra Part III.E. 
 262. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 (plurality opinion) (discussing the commercial/ 
noncommercial distinction in sign regulation); see also supra notes 115–20 and accompanying 
text. 
 263. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 264. See M. Ryan Calo, Note, Scylla or Charybdis: Navigating the Jurisprudence of Visual 
Clutter, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1877, 1886–87 (2005). 
 265. Id. Note that government could still prohibit the business owner from advertising 
another business on its property because this proposal considers this type of sign offsite. 
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advertising the steel from the mill and the posting of a sign 
advocating higher tariffs on foreign steel would be equally 
protected. A small mill would likely have no suitable alternative to 
conveying its position on steel tariffs other than a sign on its 
property. 
A final consideration of this proposal is that, with respect to 
onsite signs, government is completely foreclosed from determining 
the value of the onsite speech in its regulation, be it commercial or 
noncommercial.266 Likewise, this proposal adheres to Metromedia’s 
prohibition of regulating among different types of noncommercial 
speech.267 Government may enact measures for onsite signs only if 
they are content-neutral and regulate the specific size, location, or 
timing of onsite signs. To illustrate, a government time, manner, 
and place regulation that regulated only religious onsite signs 
would be prohibited for two reasons: first, it would favor 
commercial over noncommercial speech; second, the regulation 
would not be content-neutral.268
Government may regulate offsite signs so long as rational 
government interests exist, the regulation does not favor 
commercial over noncommercial speech, and the regulation is 
content-neutral.269 The regulation that is envisioned by this 
Comment is one that restricts all offsite signs with exceptions being 
made for onsite signs.  
Thus, this Comment answers in the negative to Judge Alito’s 
query in Rappa as to whether exceptions to a general ban “for ‘for 
sale’ signs and signs relating to onsite activities”270 render the 
statute unconstitutional: such exemptions are acceptable 
recognitions of the speech interest in onsite signs that are not 
 266. Allowing government to determine the value of speech is a major concern in First 
Amendment jurisprudence and sign/billboard regulation. See supra Part II.C; see also Rappa v. 
New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1063–64 (3d Cir. 1994).  
 267. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (plurality 
opinion). 
 268. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93–94 (1977); 
Cordes, supra note 11, at 47. 
 269. Recall that this Comment argues that exceptions for onsite signs from an otherwise 
general ban of offsite signs is not content-based because the proposal looks at the content of 
the sign only to the extent necessary to determine location dependence. See supra text 
accompanying notes 251–252.  
 270. Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1080 (Alito, J., concurring); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 229–230. 
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content-based because the content matters only in determining the 
relationship between the sign and its location. Once this 
determination is made, the onsite/offsite distinction determines the 
constitutional scrutiny, and onsite signs are properly exempted 
from an otherwise general ban. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the tangled web of Metromedia, its progeny, and the lower 
court decisions seeking to interpret and apply the decision, only 
one thing is certain: there is no certainty with sign and billboard 
regulation. Within the badly fractured, “Tower of Babel”271 
decision with five separate justices voicing differing opinions, 
Metromedia has served as a poor guide to subsequent courts as they 
have sought to develop a consistent and coherent jurisprudence of 
billboard law that balances both First Amendment Free Speech and 
government regulatory interests. 
This Comment has proposed that Metromedia be modified to 
place primary emphasis in billboard and sign analysis on the 
onsite/offsite distinction with a concomitant broadening of the 
definition of onsite. This expanded definition would incorporate 
the Court’s decisions in Linmark and Gilleo and the Rappa court’s 
location-specific test. Such a broadening recognizes that signs and 
billboards that have no suitable alternative have a speech interest 
that is dependent upon the sign; thus it should be all-but-
impossible for government to regulate these types of signs and 
completely impossible for government to prohibit these signs. 
The remaining signs within a community—termed offsite 
signs—are those signs that have readily available suitable 
alternatives. Owners of offsite signs lose no utility in their method 
of communication by using an alternative method. Because the 
speech can be readily communicated in alternative forms, the First 
Amendment does not pose nearly the barrier to regulation of offsite 
signs as it does to regulation of onsite signs, and, therefore, 
government’s regulatory power should be allowed to completely 
prohibit offsite signs if government so chooses. 
The workability of this proposal arises from its adoption and 
incorporation of the current Supreme Court precedents regarding 
 271. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 569 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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billboard/sign regulation and free speech. This proposal does not 
advocate overruling Metromedia and starting anew; rather, it 
advocates simply that Metromedia be rethought to increase 
simplicity and workability by more fully incorporating existing 
strands of speech clause doctrine, particularly the requirement of 
the necessity of available alternatives before prohibition of speech. 
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